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1.  Persistence of antibodies in adolescents 18−24 months after immunization with one, two, or three doses of 4CMenB meningococcal serogroup B vaccine 
Human Vaccines & Immunotherapeutics  2013;9(11):2304-2310.
We previously demonstrated the immunogenicity and tolerability of the serogroup B meningococcal vaccine, 4CMenB (Bexsero®), in 11−17 y-olds randomized to receive 1, 2, or 3 doses at 1, 2, or 6 mo intervals. Participants in this extension study provided an additional blood sample 18−24 mo after last vaccine dose, to assess persistence of serum bactericidal activity with human complement (hSBA), and to compare with age-matched 4CMenB-naïve controls.
In the original study, one month after one 4CMenB dose, 93% of subjects had seroprotective hSBA titers (≥4) against indicator serogroup B strains for individual vaccine antigens (fHbp, NadA and NZOMV), increasing to ~100% after two or three doses. After 18−24 mo, 62−73% of subjects given one dose had titers ≥4 against the three antigens, significantly lower rates than after two (77−94%) or three (86−97%) doses. Only proportions with titers ≥ 4 against NZOMV were significantly different between the two (77%) and three (90%, p < 0.0001) dose groups. These results confirm that two doses of 4CMenB, administered 1 to 6 mo apart, provide good levels of bactericidal activity against serogroup B meningococci, which were sustained at least 18−24 mo in over 64% of adolescents for all three tested vaccine-related antigens.
doi:10.4161/hv.25505
PMCID: PMC3981837  PMID: 23811804
meningococcal; vaccine; serogroup B; antibodies; adolescents; persistence
2.  Bacillus anthracis Aerosolization Associated with a Contaminated Mail Sorting Machine 
Emerging Infectious Diseases  2002;8(10):1044-1047.
On October 12, 2001, two envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores passed through a sorting machine in a postal facility in Washington, D.C. When anthrax infection was identified in postal workers 9 days later, the facility was closed. To determine if exposure to airborne B. anthracis spores continued to occur, we performed air sampling around the contaminated sorter. One CFU of B. anthracis was isolated from 990 L of air sampled before the machine was activated. Six CFUs were isolated during machine activation and processing of clean dummy mail. These data indicate that an employee working near this machine might inhale approximately 30 B. anthracis-containing particles during an 8-h work shift. What risk this may have represented to postal workers is not known, but the risk is approximately 20-fold less than estimates of sub-5 micron B. anthracis-containing particles routinely inhaled by asymptomatic, unvaccinated workers in a goat-hair mill.
doi:10.3201/eid0810.020356
PMCID: PMC2730297  PMID: 12396913
Bacillus anthracis; anthrax; risk assessment; occupational exposure
3.  Persistence of immune responses after a single dose of Novartis meningococcal serogroup A, C, W-135 and Y CRM-197 conjugate vaccine (Menveo®) or Menactra® among healthy adolescents 
Human Vaccines  2010;6(11):881-887.
The persistence of human bactericidal activity (hSBA) responses in adolescents was assessed 22 months after vaccination with one dose of Menveo® (MenACWY-CRM; Novartis) or Menactra® (MCV4) (sanofi pasteur). The proportion of subjects with hSBA titers ≥8 was significantly higher among recipients of MenACWY-CRM than MCV4 for serogroups A, W-135 and Y.
doi:10.4161/hv.6.11.12849
PMCID: PMC3060384  PMID: 21339701
meningococcal disease; CRM-197; Menveo; Menactra; conjugate vaccine; neisseria meningitidis
4.  First Case of Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax in the United States, Palm Beach County, Florida, 2001 
Emerging Infectious Diseases  2002;8(10):1029-1034.
On October 4, 2001, we confirmed the first bioterrorism-related anthrax case identified in the United States in a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida. Epidemiologic investigation indicated that exposure occurred at the workplace through intentionally contaminated mail. One additional case of inhalational anthrax was identified from the index patient’s workplace. Among 1,076 nasal cultures performed to assess exposure, Bacillus anthracis was isolated from a co-worker later confirmed as being infected, as well as from an asymptomatic mail-handler in the same workplace. Environmental cultures for B. anthracis showed contamination at the workplace and six county postal facilities. Environmental and nasal swab cultures were useful epidemiologic tools that helped direct the investigation towards the infection source and transmission vehicle. We identified 1,114 persons at risk and offered antimicrobial prophylaxis.
doi:10.3201/eid0810.020354
PMCID: PMC2730309  PMID: 12396910
Anthrax; Bacillus anthracis; bioterrorism; nasal swab cultures; environmental cultures

Results 1-4 (4)