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1.  Distribution of Pandemic Influenza Vaccine and Reporting of Doses Administered, New York, New York, USA 
Emerging Infectious Diseases  2014;20(4):525-531.
In 2009, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene delivered influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 (pH1N1) vaccine to health care providers, who were required to report all administered doses to the Citywide Immunization Registry. Using data from this registry and a provider survey, we estimated the number of all pH1N1 vaccine doses administered. Of 2.8 million doses distributed during October 1, 2009–March 4, 2010, a total of 988,298 doses were administered and reported; another 172,289 doses were administered but not reported, for a total of 1,160,587 doses administered during this period. Reported doses represented an estimated 80%–85% of actual doses administered. Reporting by a wide range of provider types was feasible during a pandemic. Pediatric-care providers had the highest reporting rate (93%). Other private-care providers who routinely did not report vaccinations indicated that they had few, if any, problems, thereby suggesting that mandatory reporting of all vaccines would be feasible.
PMCID: PMC3966398  PMID: 24656328
pandemic influenza vaccine; immunization information systems; vaccine reporting; viruses; New York
2.  Environmental factors potentially associated with mumps transmission in Yeshivas during a mumps outbreak among highly vaccinated students 
During 2009–2010, a large US mumps outbreak occurred affecting two-dose vaccinated 9th–12th grade Orthodox Jewish boys attending all-male yeshivas (private, traditional Jewish schools). Our objective was to understand mumps transmission dynamics in this well-vaccinated population. We surveyed 9th-12th grade male yeshivas in Brooklyn, NY with reported mumps case-students between 9/1/2009 and 3/30/2010. We assessed vaccination coverage, yeshiva environmental factors (duration of school day, density, mixing, duration of contact), and whether environmental factors were associated with increased mumps attack rates. Ten yeshivas comprising 1769 9th–12th grade students and 264 self-reported mumps cases were included. The average yeshiva attack rate was 14.5% (median: 13.5%, range: 1–31%), despite two-dose measles-mumps-rubella vaccine coverage between 90–100%. School duration was 9–15.5 h/day; students averaged 7 h face-to-face/day with 1–4 study partners. Average daily mean density was 6.6 students per 100 square feet. The number of hours spent face-to-face with a study partner and the number of partners per day showed significant positive associations (p < 0.05) with classroom mumps attack rates in univariate analysis, but these associations did not persist in multivariate analysis. This outbreak was characterized by environmental factors unique to the yeshiva setting (e.g., densely populated environment, prolonged face-to-face contact, mixing among infected students). However, these features were present in all included yeshivas, limiting our ability to discriminate differences. Nonetheless, mumps transmission requires close contact, and these environmental factors may have overwhelmed vaccine-mediated protection increasing the likelihood of vaccine failure among yeshiva students.
PMCID: PMC3667936  PMID: 23442590
mumps; mumps transmission; environmental risk factors; high MMR vaccine coverage; mumps outbreak
3.  Description of a Large Urban School-Located 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Vaccination Campaign, New York City 2009–2010 
In the spring of 2009, New York City (NYC) experienced the emergence and rapid spread of pandemic influenza A H1N1 virus (pH1N1), which had a high attack rate in children and caused many school closures. During the 2009 fall wave of pH1N1, a school-located vaccination campaign for elementary schoolchildren was conducted in order to reduce infection and transmission in the school setting, thereby reducing the impact of pH1N1 that was observed earlier in the year. In this paper, we describe the planning and outcomes of the NYC school-located vaccination campaign. We compared consent and vaccination data for three vaccination models (school nurse alone, school nurse plus contract nurse, team). Overall, >1,200 of almost 1,600 eligible schools participated, achieving 26.8% consent and 21.5% first-dose vaccination rates, which did not vary significantly by vaccination model. A total of 189,902 doses were administered during two vaccination rounds to 115,668 students at 998 schools included in the analysis; vaccination rates varied by borough, school type, and poverty level. The team model achieved vaccination of more children per day and required fewer vaccination days per school. NYC’s campaign is the largest described school-located influenza vaccination campaign to date. Despite substantial challenges, school-located vaccination is feasible in large, urban settings, and during a public health emergency.
PMCID: PMC3324602  PMID: 22318374
H1N1 influenza; Vaccination; Elementary schoolchildren
5.  An Ounce of Prevention is a Ton of Work: Mass Antibiotic Prophylaxis for Anthrax, New York City, 2001 
Emerging Infectious Diseases  2003;9(6):615-622.
Protocols for mass antibiotic prophylaxis against anthrax were under development in New York City beginning in early 1999. This groundwork allowed the city’s Department of Health to rapidly respond in 2001 to six situations in which cases were identified or anthrax spores were found. The key aspects of planning and lessons learned from each of these mass prophylaxis operations are reviewed. Antibiotic distribution was facilitated by limiting medical histories to issues relevant to prescribing prophylactic antibiotic therapy, formatting medical records to facilitate rapid decision making, and separating each component activity into discrete work stations. Successful implementation of mass prophylaxis operations was characterized by clarity of mission and eligibility criteria, well-defined lines of authority and responsibilities, effective communication, collaboration among city agencies (including law enforcement), and coordination of staffing and supplies. This model can be adapted for future planning needs including possible attacks with other bioterrorism agents, such as smallpox.
PMCID: PMC3000161  PMID: 12780998
anthrax prophylaxis; bioterrorism; public health response; policy review

Results 1-5 (5)