Related Articles

Background

Primary care reform in Ontario, Canada, included the initiation of a blended capitation model in 2001–2002 and an enhanced fee-for-service model in 2003. Both models involve patient rostering, incentives for preventive care and requirements for after-hours care. We evaluated practice characteristics and patterns of care under both models.

Methods

Using administrative data, we identified physicians belonging to either the capitation or the enhanced fee-for-service group throughout the period from Sept. 1, 2005, to Aug. 31, 2006, and their enrolled patients. Practices were stratified by location (urban v. rural). We compared the groups in terms of practice characteristics and patterns of care, including comprehensiveness of care, continuity of care, after-hours care, visits to the emergency department and uptake of new patients.

Results

Patients in the capitation and enhanced fee-for-service practices had similar demographic characteristics. Patients in capitation practices had lower morbidity and comorbidity indices. Comprehensiveness and continuity of care were similar between the 2 groups. Compared with patients in enhanced fee-for-service practices, those in capitation practices had less after-hours care (adjusted rate ratio [RR] 0.68, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.61–0.75) and more visits to emergency departments (adjusted RR 1.20, 95% CI 1.15–1.25). Overall, physicians in the capitation group enrolled fewer new patients than did physicians in the enhanced fee-for-service group (37.0 v. 52.0 per physician); the same was true of new graduates (60.3 v. 72.1 per physician).

Interpretation

Physicians enrolled in the capitation model had different practice characteristics than those in the enhanced fee-for-service model. These characteristics appeared to be pre-existing and not due to enrolment in a new model. Although the capitation model provides an alternative to fee-for-service practice, its characteristics should be the focus of future policy development and research.

Background

Systems to exempt the indigent from user fees have been put in place to prevent the worst-off from being excluded from health care services for lack of funds. Yet the implementation of these mechanisms is as rare as the operational research on this topic. This article analyzes an action research project aimed at finding an appropriate solution to make health care accessible to the indigent in a rural district of Burkina Faso.

Research

This action research project was initiated in 2007 to study the feasibility and effectiveness of a community-based, participative and financially sustainable process for exempting the indigent from user fees. A interdisciplinary team of researchers from Burkina Faso and Canada was mobilized to document this action research project.

Results and knowledge sharing

The action process was very well received. Indigent selection was effective and strengthened local solidarity, but coverage was reduced by the lack of local financial resources. Furthermore, the indigent have many other needs that cannot be addressed by exemption from user fees. Several knowledge transfer strategies were implemented to share research findings with residents and with local and national decision-makers.

Partnership achievements and difficulties

Using a mixed and interdisciplinary research approach was critical to grasping the complexity of this community-based process. The adoption of the process and the partnership with local decision-makers were very effective. Therefore, at the instigation of an NGO, four other districts in Burkina Faso and Niger reproduced this experiment. However, national decision-makers showed no interest in this action and still seem unconcerned about finding solutions that promote access to health care for the indigent.

Lessons learned

The lessons learned with regard to knowledge transfer and partnerships between researchers and associated decision-makers are: i) involve potential users of the research results from the research planning stage; ii) establish an ongoing partnership between researchers and users; iii) ensure that users can participate in certain research activities; iv) use a variety of strategies to disseminate results; and v) involve users in dissemination activities.

Background

It has been argued that quality improvements that result from user charges reduce their negative impact on utilization especially of the poor. In Uganda, because there was no concrete evidence for improvements in quality of care following the introduction of user charges, the government abolished user fees in all public health units on 1st March 2001. This gave us the opportunity to prospectively study how different aspects of quality of care change, as a country changes its health financing options from user charges to free services, in a developing country setting. The outcome of the study may then provide insights into policy actions to maintain quality of care following removal of user fees.

Methods

A population cohort and representative health facilities were studied longitudinally over 3 years after the abolition of user fees. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to obtain data. Parameters evaluated in relation to quality of care included availability of drugs and supplies and; health worker variables.

Results

Different quality variables assessed showed that interventions that were put in place were able to maintain, or improve the technical quality of services. There were significant increases in utilization of services, average drug quantities and stock out days improved, and communities reported health workers to be hardworking, good and dedicated to their work to mention but a few. Communities were more appreciative of the services, though expectations were lower. However, health workers felt they were not adequately motivated given the increased workload.

Conclusion

The levels of technical quality of care attained in a system with user fees can be maintained, or even improved without the fees through adoption of basic, sustainable system modifications that are within the reach of developing countries. However, a trade-off between residual perceptions of reduced service quality, and the welfare gains from removal of user fees should guide such a policy change.

Background

In 2006, the Parliament of Burkina Faso passed a policy to reduce the direct costs of obstetric services and neonatal care in the country’s health centres, aiming to lower the country’s high national maternal mortality and morbidity rates. Implementation was via a “partial exemption” covering 80% of the costs. In 2008 the German NGO HELP launched a pilot project in two health districts to eliminate the remaining 20% of user fees. Regardless of any exemptions, women giving birth in Burkina Faso’s health centres face additional expenses that often represent an additional barrier to accessing health services. We compared the total cost of giving birth in health centres offering partial exemption versus those with full exemption to assess the impact on additional out-of-pocket fees.

Methods

A case–control study was performed to compare medical expenses. Case subjects were women who gave birth in 12 health centres located in the Dori and Sebba districts, where HELP provided full fee exemption for obstetric services and neonatal care. Controls were from six health centres in the neighbouring Djibo district where a partial fee exemption was in place. A random sample of approximately 50 women per health centre was selected for a total of 870 women.

Results

There was an implementation gap regarding the full exemption for obstetric services and neonatal care. Only 1.1% of the sample from Sebba but 17.5% of the group from Dori had excessive spending on birth related costs, indicating that women who delivered in Sebba were much less exposed to excessive medical expenses than women from Dori. Additional out-of-pocket fees in the full exemption health districts took into account household ability to pay, with poorer women generally paying less.

Conclusions

We found that the elimination of fees for facility-based births benefits especially the poorest households. The existence of excessive spending related to direct costs of giving birth is of concern, making it urgent for the government to remove all direct fees for obstetric and neonatal care. However, the policy of completely abolishing user fees is insufficient; the implementation process must have a thorough monitoring system to reduce implementation gaps.

Objective To estimate how many child deaths might be prevented if user fees were removed in 20 African countries

Design Simulation model combining evidence on key health interventions' impacts on reducing child mortality with analysis of the effect of fee abolition on access to healthcare services.

Results Elimination of user fees could prevent approximately 233 000 (estimate range 153 000-305 000) deaths annually in children aged under 5 in 20 African countries.

Conclusion Given the relatively low cost of abolition, replacing user fees with alternative financing mechanisms should be seen as an effective first step towards improving households' access to health care and achieving the millennium development goals for health.

Background

New Zealand's Primary Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS) was introduced in 2002. Its features are substantial increases in government funding delivered as capitation payments, and newly-created service-purchasing agencies. The objectives are to reduce health disparities and to improve health outcomes.

Analysis

The NZPHCS changes New Zealand's publicly-funded primary health care payments from targeted welfare benefits to universal, risk-rated insurance premium subsidies. Patient contributions change from fee-for-service top-ups to insurance premium top-ups, and are collected by service providers who, depending upon their contracts with purchasers, may also be either insurance agents or risk-bearing insurance companies. The change invokes the tensions associated with allocating risk-bearing amongst providers, patients and insurance companies that accompany all insurance-based funding instruments. These include increases in existing incentives for over-consumption and new incentives for insurers to limit their exposure to variations in patient health states by engaging in active patient pool selection.

The New Zealand scheme is complex, but closely resembles United States insurance-based, risk-rated managed care schemes. The key difference is that unlike classic managed care models, where provider remuneration is determined by the insurer, the historic right for general practitioners to autonomously set patient charges alters the fiscal incentives normally available to managed care organisations. Consequently, the insurance role is being devolved to individual service providers with very small patient pools, who must recoup the premium top-ups from insured individuals. Premium top-ups are being collected only from those individuals consuming care, in proportion to the number of times care is sought. Co-payments thus constitute perfectly risk-rated premium levies set by inefficiently small insurers, raising questions about the efficiency and equity of a 'universal' insurance system pooling total population demands and costs. The efficacy of using financial incentives to constrain costs and encourage innovation when providers retain the right to arbitrarily recoup costs directly from patients, is also questioned.

Results

Initial evidence suggests that total costs are higher than initially expected, and prices to some patients have risen substantially under the NZPHCS. Limited competition and NZPHCS governance requirements mean current institutional arrangements are unlikely to facilitate efficiency improvements. System design changes therefore appear indicated.

Summary

Background

To improve access to skilled attendance at delivery and thereby reduce maternal mortality, the Government of Ghana introduced a policy exempting all women attending health facilities from paying delivery care fees.

Objective

To examine the effect of the exemption policy on delivery-related maternal mortality.

Methods

Maternal deaths in 9 and 12 hospitals in the Central Region (CR) and the Volta Region (VR) respectively were analysed. The study covered a period of 11 and 12 months before and after the introduction of the policy between 2004 and 2006. Maternal deaths were identified by screening registers and clinical notes of all deaths in women aged 15–49 years in all units of the hospitals. These deaths were further screened for those related to delivery. The total births in the study period were also obtained in order to calculate maternal mortality ratios (MMR).

Results

A total of 1220 (78.8%) clinical notes of 1549 registered female deaths were retrieved. A total of 334 (21.6%) maternal deaths were identified. The delivery-related MMR decreased from 445 to 381 per 100,000 total births in the CR and from 648 to 391 per 100,000 total births in the VR following the implementation of the policy. The changes in the 2 regions were not statistically significant (p=0.458) and (p=0.052) respectively. No significant changes in mean age of delivery-related deaths, duration of admission and causes of deaths before and after the policy in both regions.

Conclusion

The delivery-related institutional maternal mortality did not appear to have been significantly affected after about one year of implementation of the policy.

New Zealand's health sector has undergone three significant restructures within 10 years. The most recent has involved a Primary Health Care Strategy, launched in 2001. Primary Health Organisations (PHOs), administered by 21 District Health Boards, are the local structures for implementing the Primary Health Care Strategy. Ninety-three percent of the New Zealand population is now enrolled within 79 PHOs, which pose a challenge to the well-established Independent Practitioner Associations (IPAs).

Although there was initial widespread support for the philosophy underlying the Primary Health Care Strategy, there are concerns amongst general practitioners (GPs) and their professional organisations relating to its implementation. These centre around 6 main issues:

1. Loss of autonomy

2. Inadequate management funding and support

3. Inconsistency and variations in contracting processes

4. Lack of publicity and advice around enrolment issues

5. Workforce and workload issues

6. Financial risks

On the other hand, many GPs are feeling positive regarding the opportunities for PHOs, particularly for being involved in the provision of a wider range of community health services. Australia has much to learn from New Zealand's latest health sector and primary health care reforms.

The key lessons concern:

• the need for a national primary health care strategy

• active engagement of general practitioners and their professional organisations

• recognition of implementation costs

• the need for infrastructural support, including information technology and quality systems

• robust management and governance arrangements

• issues related to critical mass and population/distance trade offs in service delivery models

Study objective

The impact of isolated gatekeeping on health care costs remains unclear. The aim of this study was to assess to what extent lower costs in a gatekeeping plan compared with a fee for service plan were attributable to more efficient resource management, or explained by risk selection.

Design

Year 2000 costs to the Swiss statutory sick funds and potentially relevant covariates were assessed retrospectively from beneficiaries participating in an observational study, their primary care physicians, and insurance companies. To adjust for case mix, two‐part regression models of health care costs were fitted, consisting of logistic models of any costs occurring, and of generalised linear models of the amount of costs in persons with non‐zero costs. Complementary data sources were used to identify selection effects.

Setting

A gatekeeping plan introduced in 1997 and a fee for service plan, in Aarau, Switzerland.

Participants

Of each plan, 905 randomly selected adult beneficiaries were invited. The overall participation rate was 39%, but was unevenly distributed between plans.

Main results

The characteristics of gatekeeping and fee for service beneficiaries were largely similar. Unadjusted total costs per person were Sw fr231 (8%) lower in the gatekeeping group. After multivariate adjustment, the estimated cost savings achieved by replacing fee for service based health insurance with gatekeeping in the source population amounted to Sw fr403–517 (15%–19%) per person. Some selection effects were detected but did not substantially influence this result. An impact of non‐detected selection effects cannot be ruled out.

Conclusions

This study hints at substantial cost savings through gatekeeping that are not attributable to mere risk selection.

Objective

To determine whether children on fee-for-service Medicaid who switch primary care doctors use less health care and are less up to date with preventive care visits than children who do not switch primary care doctors.

Design

Retrospective cohort study using Medicaid claims data.

Setting

51,027 children enrolled on Medicaid in Monroe County, New York.

Patients

14,187 children enrolled continuously on fee-for-service Medicaid between January 1992 and December 1994.

Main Outcome Measures

Utilization of primary care, emergency department (ED) services, and specialty care and proportion up to date with preventive care visits according to American Academy of Pediatrics guidelines.

Results

During the 2-year study period, 22% of children switched primary care doctors. Compared with children who did not switch primary care doctors, those who switched had more primary care visits (4.7 vs. 3.2 visits/year,P<.01), age-adjusted preventive care visits (1.2 vs. 1.0 visits/year), ED visits (0.72 vs. 0.47 visits/year,P<.01), and specialist visits (0.99 vs. 0.31,P<.01). On multivariate analysis, doctor switching was associated with increased odds of being up to date with preventive care visits (odds ratio [OR]=1.7; 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.3 to 2.1). However, on multivariate analysis stratified by age, the association was significant only for older children (ages 11 to 14). Altogether, 68% of all children and 44% of infants less than 1 year old made the recommended number of preventive care visits during the study period.

Conclusions

All groups of children received less preventive care than recommended by the American Academy of Pediatrics. Children who switched primary care doctors had higher utilization of health care, including primary care, ED, and specialty care. Contrary to expectations, they were more likely to be up to date with preventive care visits. The heavy utilization of health services by doctor switchers indicates that this subgroup of children on Medicaid may not be at risk for poor access to health care, but additional research is needed to determine whether the quality of care is related to doctor switching.

User fees were introduced in public health facilities in Cambodia in 1997 in order to inject funds into the health system to enhance the quality of services. Because of inadequate health insurance, a social safety net scheme was introduced to ensure that all people were able to attend the health facilities. However, continuing high rates of hospitalization and mortality from dengue fever among infants and children reflect the difficulties that women continue to face in finding sufficient cash in cases of medical emergency, resulting in delays in diagnosis and treatment. In this article, drawing on in-depth interviews conducted with mothers of children infected with dengue in eastern Cambodia, we illustrate the profound economic consequences for households when a child is ill. The direct costs for health care and medical services, and added indirect costs, deterred poor women from presenting with sick children. Those who eventually sought care often had to finance health spending through out-of-pocket payments and loans, or sold property, goods or labour to meet the costs. Costs were often catastrophic, exacerbating the extreme poverty of those least able to afford it.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the effect of physician payment method on use of health care resources. DESIGN: Retrospective analysis of patient health care data collected for 3 years (1994 to 1996) from the Vital Statistics Department of the British Columbia Ministry of Health. Billing numbers identified physician payment method. SETTING: Salaried and fee-for-service primary care practices in the Capital Region District of Victoria, BC. PARTICIPANTS: A total of 582 patients in their last year of life: 106 were attended by salaried family physicians at a community health clinic; 476 were attended by fee-for-service practitioners. Groups were comparable in age, sex, and geographical location. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Number and cost of specialist and diagnostic services and medications, number of days in hospital (acute and extended care), and main causes of death. RESULTS: None of the dependent measures showed any statistically significant differences based on comparisons between many variables for patients in the two groups. Costs of pharmaceutical, specialist, and diagnostic services were not significantly different for the two groups. There were three main causes of death, according to codes on death certificates: heart disease, malignant neoplasms, and cerebrovascular disease. CONCLUSION: Whether physicians were paid by salary or fee-for-service had no empirical effect on health care resource use.

We interviewed health care providers representing 23 fee-for-service (FFS) practices, 19 health service organizations (HSOs) and 11 community health centres (CHCs) in Ontario to compare self-reported approaches to disease prevention and health promotion. Few significant differences were found across practice types in the presence of recall systems for screening or in knowledge of, compliance with or estimated coverage for selected preventive maneuvers recommended by the Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health Examination. CHCs reported a significantly greater variety of formal health promotion programs and a greater tendency to use nonphysician health care personnel to carry out both prevention and health promotion activities. The results must be interpreted with caution because of the use of self-reported data, the low response rate for FFS practices and the use of a restrictive definition of disease prevention tied to evidence from the reports of the task force. Thus, the results cast some doubt on the common assumption that increasing the population served by alternative modes of delivery such as HSOs and CHCs necessarily increases the level of disease prevention and health promotion activity.

Chiropractic fee negotiations in Saskatchewan utilize the Chiropractic Compensation Review Committee with recourse to the Chiropractic Consultation Committee. Health care professionals who practise on a fee for service basis provide the government with a budgetary problem. Although the fees are set, the health care provider can determine his own income by deciding how many visit services he/she wishes to provide. In the fiscal years 1981-82 to 1990-91, chiropractors earned $699.00 per year more than one would expect given the increases in fee schedules. Each chiropractor earned $2,329.00 per year more than was necessary to make up for losses due to inflation. The allegation that unnecessary treatments were performed on patients is countered by analysis of the services per discrete patient values by mode of practice. The increased earnings of chiropractors was accomplished by treating an increasing percentage of the population who sought health care. Comparative information was obtained from the four western provinces.

In 1969 the Cleveland Health Sciences Library began an Institutional Membership. This was to be a fee-for-service arrangement to provide for library service, consultation on library and related matters, and development of educational programs for a wide range of institutional staff. Over fifty institutions now belong. Experience suggests that serious questions are raised by such a relationship between a resource library and libraries in a number of institutions. The membership involves a per capita cost for Cleveland hospitals with house staff, and a cost-plus-fixed-fee for others. Total access has been provided in hopes that experience in use can lead to the development of costs and policies.

INTRODUCTION

When patients pay for care out-of-pocket, physicians must balance their professional obligations to serve with the commercial demands of medical practice. Consumer-directed health care makes this problem newly pressing, but law and ethics have thought for millennia about how doctors should bill patients.

Historical Background

At various points in European history, the law restricted doctors’ ability to bill for their services, but this legal aversion to commercializing medicine did not take root in the American colonies. Rather, US law has always treated selling medical services the way it treats other sales. Yet doctors acted differently in a crucial way. Driven by the economics of medical practice before the spread of health insurance, doctors charged patients according to what they thought each patient could afford. The use of sliding fee scales persisted until widespread health insurance drove a standardization of fees.

Current Practice

Today, encouraged by Medicare rules and managed care discounts, providers use a perverse form of a sliding scale that charges the most to patients who can afford the least. Primary care physicians typically charge uninsured patients one third to one half more than they receive from insurers for basic office or hospital visits, and markups are substantially higher (2 to 2.5 times) for high-tech tests and specialists’ invasive procedures.

CONCLUSION

Ethical and professional principles might require providers to return to discounting fees for patients in straitened circumstances, but imposing such a duty formally (by law or by ethical code) on doctors would be harder both in principle and in practice than to impose such a duty on hospitals. Still, professional ethics should encourage physicians to give patients in economic trouble at least the benefit of the lowest rate they accept from an established payer.

Data held by a London family practitioner committee for the purpose of paying general practitioners' capitation and item of service fees were analysed every quarter for one year to provide an information service for general practices in the area. Each practice received a quarterly printout showing the age structure of its patient population, the numbers of new registrations and removals and data about items of service. These were expressed as rates which could be compared with those of the area as a whole, and with the highest and lowest rates found in individual practices. A survey at the end of the year showed that the service was welcomed and found useful by the practices. A fully computerized family practitioner committee could provide a similar service without great difficulty, and could make it more informative by linking items of service to specific age groups; data about prescribing and use of hospital and district services could also be incorporated when the relevant agencies are fully computerized too.

Nurses with advanced training—diabetes resource nurses (DRNs)—can improve care for people with diabetes in capitated payment settings. Their effectiveness in fee-for-service settings has not been investigated. We conducted a 12-month practice-randomized trial involving 22 practices in a fee-for-service metropolitan network with 92 primary care physicians caring for 1891 Medicare patients ≥65 years with diabetes mellitus. Each practice was randomized to one of three intervention groups: physician feedback on process measures using Medicare claims data; Medicare claims feedback plus feedback on clinical measures from medical record (MR) abstraction; or both types of feedback plus a practice-based DRN. The primary endpoint investigated was hemoglobin A1c level. Other measures were low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol level, blood pressure, annual hemoglobin A1c testing, annual LDL screening, annual eye exam, annual foot exam, and annual renal assessment. Data were collected from medical chart abstraction and Medicare claims. The number of patients with hemoglobin A1c <9% increased by 4 (0.9%) in the Claims group; 9 (2.1%) in the Claims + MR group (comparison with Claims: P = 0.97); and 16 (3.8%) in the DRN group (comparison with Claims: P = 0.31). Results were similar for the other clinical outcomes, with no differences significant at P = 0.10. For process of care measures, decreases were seen in all groups, with no significant differences in change scores. Quality improvement strategies must be evaluated in the appropriate setting. Initiatives that have been effective in capitated systems may not be effective in fee-for-service environments.

To identify the self-reported differences in preventive practices, attitudes, and beliefs of physicians practicing in fee-for-service (FFS) and health maintenance organization (HMO) settings, we surveyed a 100% sample of primary care physicians practicing in a large, urban, closed-panel HMO and a random sample of physicians, in the same county, who were in an FFS practice. The FFS physicians were more likely to consider behavioral risk factors important than were HMO physicians, and they were more likely to ask their patients about behavioral risk factors. Fee-for-service physicians were more likely than HMO physicians to use continuing medical education courses to upgrade their skills in modifying behavioral risk factors. There was little difference in the self-reported proportion of patients with specific behavioral risks in the FFS and HMO practices. Also, both groups were comparable in their perception of their ability to do behavioral counseling and their perceived success in such counseling. We conclude that FFS physicians are more likely to have positive preventive beliefs, attitudes, and practices than are HMO physicians.

Background

User fees for primary care services were removed in rural districts in Zambia in 2006. Experience from other countries has suggested that health workers play a key role in determining the success of a fee removal policy, but also find the implementation of such a policy challenging. The policy was introduced against a backdrop of a major shortage in qualified health staff.

Methods

As part of a larger study on the experience and effect of user fee removal in Zambia, a number of case studies at the facility level were conducted. As part of these, quantitative and qualitative data were collected to evaluate health workers’ satisfaction and experiences in charging and non-charging facilities.

Results

Our findings show that health-care workers have mixed feelings about the policy change and its consequences. We found some evidence that personnel motivation was higher in non-charging facilities compared to facilities still charging. Yet it is unclear whether this effect was due to differences in the user fee policy or to the fact that a lot of staff interviewed in non-charging facilities were working in mission facilities, where we found a significantly higher motivation. Health workers expressed satisfaction with an apparent increase in the number of patients visiting the facilities and the removal of a deterring factor for many needy patients, but also complained about an increased workload. Furthermore, working conditions were said to have worsened, which staff felt was linked to the absence of additional resources to deal with the increased demand or replace the loss of revenue generated by fees.

Conclusion

These findings highlight the need to pay attention to supply-side measures when removing demand-side barriers such as user fees and in particular to be concerned about the burden that increased demand can place on already over-stretched health workers.

Background

African policy-makers are increasingly considering abolishing user fees as a solution to improve access to health care systems. There is little evidence on this subject in West Africa, and particularly in countries that have organized their healthcare system on the basis of the Bamako Initiative. This article presents a process evaluation of an NGO intervention to abolish user fees in Niger for children under five years and pregnant women.

Methods

The intervention was launched in 2006 in two health districts and 43 health centres. The intervention consisted of abolishing user fees and improving the quality of services (drugs, ambulance, etc.). We carried out a process evaluation in April 2007 using qualitative and quantitative data. Three data collection methods were used: i) individual in-depth interviews (n = 85) and focus groups (n = 8); ii) participant observation in 12 health centres; and iii) self-administered structured questionnaires (n = 51 health staff).

Results

The population favoured abolition; health officials and local decision-makers were in favour, but they worried about its sustainability. Among health workers, opposition to providing free services was more widespread. The strengths of the process were: a top-down phase of information and raising community awareness; appropriate incentive measures; a good drug supply system; and the organization of a medical evacuation system. The major weaknesses of the process were: the perverse effects of incentive bonuses; the lack of community-based management committees' involvement in the management; the creation of a system running in parallel with the BI system; the lack of action to support the service offer; and the poor coordination of the availability of free services at different levels of the health pyramid. Some unintended outcomes are also documented.

Conclusion

The linkages between systems in which some patients pay (Bamako Initiative) and some do not should be carefully considered and organized in accordance with the local reality. For the poorest patients to really benefit, it is essential that, at the same time, the quality of services be improved and mechanisms be put in place to prevent abuses. Much remains to be done to generate knowledge on the processes for abolishing fees in West Africa.

Background

User fees were generalized in Burkina Faso in the 1990 s. At the time of their implementation, it was envisioned that measures would be instituted to exempt the poor from paying these fees. However, in practice, the identification of indigents is ineffective, and so they do not have access to care. Thus, a community-based process for selecting indigents for user fees exemption was tested in a district. In each of the 124 villages in the catchment areas of ten health centres, village committees proposed lists of indigents that were then validated by the health centres' management committees. The objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of this community-based selection.

Methods

An indigent-selection process is judged effective if it minimizes inclusion biases and exclusion biases. The study compares the levels of poverty and of vulnerability of indigents selected by the management committees (n = 184) with: 1) indigents selected in the villages but not retained by these committees (n = 48); ii) indigents selected by the health centre nurses (n = 82); and iii) a sample of the rural population (n = 5,900).

Results

The households in which the three groups of indigents lived appeared to be more vulnerable and poorer than the reference rural households. Indigents selected by the management committees and the nurses were very comparable in terms of levels of vulnerability, but the former were more vulnerable socially. The majority of indigents proposed by the village committees who lived in extremely poor households were retained by the management committees. Only 0.36% of the population living below the poverty threshold and less than 1% of the extremely poor population were selected.

Conclusions

The community-based process minimized inclusion biases, as the people selected were poorer and more vulnerable than the rest of the population. However, there were significant exclusion biases; the selection was very restrictive because the exemption had to be endogenously funded.

Valéry Ridde and Slim Haddad discuss a new trial in Ghana in which households were randomized into a pre-payment scheme allowing free primary care or to a control group who paid user fees for health care.

Background

Removing user fees in primary health care services is one of the most critical policy issues being considered in Africa. User fees were introduced in many African countries during the 1980s and their impacts are well documented. Concerns regarding the negative impacts of user fees have led to a recent shift in health financing debates in Africa. Kenya is one of the countries that have implemented a user fees reduction policy. Like in many other settings, the new policy was evaluated less that one year after implementation, the period when expected positive impacts are likely to be highest. This early evaluation showed that the policy was widely implemented, that levels of utilization increased and that it was popular among patients. Whether or not the positive impacts of user fees removal policies are sustained has hardly been explored. We conducted this study to document the extent to which primary health care facilities in Kenya continue to adhere to a 'new' charging policy 3 years after its implementation.

Methods

Data were collected in two districts (Kwale and Makueni). Multiple methods of data collection were applied including a cross-sectional survey (n = 184 households Kwale; 141 Makueni), Focus Group Discussions (n = 12) and patient exit interviews (n = 175 Kwale; 184 Makueni).

Results

Approximately one third of the survey respondents could not correctly state the recommended charges for dispensaries, while half did not know what the official charges for health centres were. Adherence to the policy was poor in both districts, but facilities in Makueni were more likely to adhere than those in Kwale. Only 4 facilities in Kwale adhered to the policy compared to 10 in Makueni. Drug shortage, declining revenue, poor policy design and implementation processes were the main reasons given for poor adherence to the policy.

Conclusion

We conclude that reducing user fees in primary health care in Kenya is a policy on paper that is yet to be implemented fully. We recommend that caution be taken when deciding on how to reduce or abolish user fees and that all potential consequences are carefully considered.

BACKGROUND: "Fee code creep" is the increasing tendency of primary care physicians in Ontario to bill for more intermediate than minor assessments over time. The authors examine the extent and nature of fee code creep and describe physician characteristics associated with the changes. METHODS: A cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of Ontario Health Insurance Plan billing and physician characteristic data was conducted for fee-for-service general practitioners and family physicians (GP/FPs) in Ontario. The ratio of intermediate to minor assessments (I-M ratio) was determined for the period 1978-79 to 1994-95, and the relation of various physician characteristics to high ratios was tested with bivariate and multivariate analysis. RESULTS: The I-M ratio rose 10-fold, from 0.3 in 1978-79 to 2.9 in 1994-95. Although the I-M ratio was higher for older patients and young children, changes in population age profile over time did not account for any of the increase. The median ratio varied widely among groups of physicians: urban physicians had higher ratios than rural ones (3.9 v. 3.0, p < 0.05), and recent graduates had higher ratios than physicians 60 years of age or older (5.1 v. 2.9, p < 0.05). The I-M ratio was inversely related to number of visits; physicians billing for fewer than 5000 visits had a median ratio of 4.2, whereas those billing for 20,000 visits or more had a median ratio of 1.6. INTERPRETATION: Fee code creep has contributed to expenditure growth in Ontario. This phenomenon was related to both an increase in I-M ratio over time among physicians practising throughout the study period and an influx of new physicians billing at a higher ratio. Creep was not the result of aging of the population.