Objectives: (1) To review the history of the tobacco industry supported Australian Tobacco Research Foundation (ATRF)(1970–1994) for evidence of the industry's use of the Foundation to further its objectives that "more research was needed" on smoking and health and to promulgate the view that nicotine was not addictive. (2) To review efforts by public health advocates to discredit the ATRF as a public relations tool used by the Australian industry.
Methods: Systematic search of previously internal industry documents released through the US Master Settlement Agreement.
Results: The ATRF was headed by prestigious Australian medical scientists, with at least one considered by the industry to be "industry positive". An international ATRF symposium on nicotine was vetted by the industry and heavily attended by industry approved scientists. Following sustained criticism from the health and medical community about the industry's creation of the ATRF to further its objectives, the ATRF's scientific committee was provoked to publicly declare in 1988 that smoking was a causative agent in disease. This criticism led to growing ATRF boycotts by scientists and substandard applications, causing the industry to see the ATRF as being poor value-for-money and eventually abandoning it.
Conclusions: The raison d'etre for the ATRF's establishment was to allow the Australian industry to point to its continuing commitment to independent medical research, with the implied corollary that tobacco control measures were premature in the face of insufficient evidence about tobacco's harms. Sustained criticism of tobacco industry funded research schemes can undermine their credibility among the scientific community.
A mailed survey of occupational health and safety practices in industrial manufacturing plants with more than 50 employees was carried out in South Carolina, with a response rate of 60 percent. The responding plants represented 73 percent of the total workforce in the industries. Data were analyzed in relation to the types of industry as delineated by the Standard Industrial Code. Eighty-three percent of the responding plants (a percentage that represented more than 92 percent of the total workforce in the industries) had some arrangements for the medical or nursing care of employees. For the study, occupational health services were defined at three levels: basic (mandatory), secondary (beneficial to management), and tertiary (health promotion-preventive medicine). The basic services provided by most of the industries surveyed appeared to be adequate. Secondary services were well developed except in the apparel and lumber industries. Tertiary services, in terms of five selected preventive programs, were moderately developed only in the paper, petroleum, and chemical industries. Only alcohol abuse control programs were commonly offered in the other types of industry. The size of the workforce in a plant partly dictated the level of occupational health services it offered but did not always account for all inter-industry variation.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an integral element of how the alcohol industry promotes itself. The existing analyses of CSR in the alcohol industry point to the misleading nature of these CSR practices. Yet, research has been relatively sparse on how the alcohol industry advances CSR in an attempt to facilitate underlying business interests, and in what ways the ongoing display of industry CSR impacts public health. This paper aims to investigate the alcohol industry’s recent CSR engagements and explain how CSR forms part of the industry’s wider political and corporate strategies.
Our study used qualitative methods to collect and analyse data. We searched for materials pertaining to CSR activities from websites of three transnational alcohol corporations, social media platforms, media reports and other sources. Relevant documents were thematically analysed with an iterative approach.
Our analysis identified three CSR tactics employed by the alcohol companies which are closely tied in with the industry’s underlying corporate intents. First, the alcohol manufacturers employ CSR as a means to frame issues, define problems and guide policy debates. In doing this, the alcohol companies are able to deflect and shift the blame from those who manufacture and promote alcoholic products to those who consume them. Second, the alcohol corporations promote CSR initiatives on voluntary regulation in order to delay and offset alcohol control legislation. Third, the alcohol corporations undertake philanthropic sponsorships as a means of indirect brand marketing as well as gaining preferential access to emerging alcohol markets.
The increasing penetration and involvement of the alcohol industry into CSR highlights the urgent needs for public health counter actions. Implementation of any alcohol control measures should include banning or restricting the publicity efforts of the industry’s CSR and informing the public of the alcohol industry’s notion of social responsibility. More significantly, an internationally binding instrument should be called for to enable countries to differentiate between genuine concerns and spurious altruism, and in doing so, resist the industry’s attempt to erode alcohol control.
Alcohol industry; Corporate social responsibility; Politics; Alcohol policies; Framework convention
In 1992, 1998, and 2006, questionnaires were sent to stratified samples of residents aged 18–75 years living near petrochemical industries (n = 600–800 people on each occasion) and in a control area (n = 200–1,000). The aims were to estimate the long-term prevalence and change over time of annoyance caused by industrial odour, industrial noise, and worries about possible health effects, and to identify risk indicators. In 2006, 20% were annoyed by industrial odour, 27% by industrial noise (1–4% in the control area), and 40–50% were worried about health effects or industrial accidents (10–20% in the control area). Multiple logistic regression analyses revealed significantly lower prevalence of odour annoyance in 1998 and 2006 than in 1992, while industrial noise annoyance increased significantly over time. The prevalence of worry remained constant. Risk of odour annoyance increased with female sex, worry of health effects, annoyance by motor vehicle exhausts and industrial noise. Industrial noise annoyance was associated with traffic noise annoyance and worry of health effects of traffic. Health-risk worry due to industrial air pollution was associated with female sex, having children, annoyance due to dust/soot in the air, and worry of traffic air pollution.
petrochemical industry; industrial noise; industrial air pollution; annoyance; worry
Objective: To review critically the history of Australian tobacco industry efforts to avoid, delay, and dilute pack warnings on cigarettes.
Design: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of tobacco industry internal documents made available through the Master Settlement Agreement.
Results: Four industry strategies and six recurrent arguments used by the industry are described, which were used to thwart the passage of three generations of health warnings (implemented in 1973, 1987, and 1995). These strategies are shown to have been associated with major delays in the implementation of the warnings and in keeping them inconspicuous, unattributed to the industry and non-specific, and particularly in delaying the use of warnings about addiction. The industry today continues to oppose warnings, which might "repel" smokers from tobacco use.
Conclusions: Efforts by governments to introduce potent health warnings will be resisted by the tobacco industry. Tobacco control advocates should anticipate and counter the strategies and arguments used by the industry, which are described in this paper if they wish to maximise the use of the pack as a vehicle for raising awareness about the harms of smoking.
Keeping in view of rapid industrialization and growing Indian economy, there has been a substantial increase in the workforce in India. Currently there is no organized workplace model for promoting health of industrial workers in India.
To develop and implement a healthy workplace model in three industrial settings of North India.
Materials and Methods:
An operations research was conducted for 12 months in purposively selected three industries of Chandigarh. In phase I, a multi-stakeholder workshop was conducted to finalize the components and tools for the healthy workplace model. NCD risk factors were assessed in 947 employees in these three industries. In phase II, the healthy workplace model was implemented on pilot basis for a period of 12 months in these three industries to finalize the model.
Healthy workplace committee with involvement of representatives of management, labor union and research organization was formed in three industries. Various tools like comprehensive and rapid healthy workplace assessment forms, NCD work-lite format for risk factors surveillance and monitoring and evaluation format were developed. The prevalence of tobacco use, ever alcoholics was found to be 17.8% and 47%, respectively. Around one-third (28%) of employees complained of back pain in the past 12 months. Healthy workplace model with focus on three key components (physical environment, psychosocial work environment, and promoting healthy habits) was developed, implemented on pilot basis, and finalized based on experience in participating industries. A stepwise approach for model with a core, expanded, and optional components were also suggested. An accreditation system is also required for promoting healthy workplace program.
Integrated healthy workplace model is feasible, could be implemented in industrial setting in northern India and needs to be pilot tested in other parts of the country.
Experience from industry; health promotion; healthy workplace
Objectives: To assess public attitudes toward the tobacco industry and its products, and to identify predictors of attitudes supportive of tobacco industry denormalisation.
Design: Population based, cross sectional survey.
Setting: Ontario, Canada.
Subjects: Adult population (n = 1607).
Main outcome measures: Eight different facets of tobacco industry denormalisation were assessed. A denormalisation scale was developed to examine predictors of attitudes supportive of tobacco industry denormalisation, using bivariate and multivariate analyses.
Results: Attitudes to the eight facets of tobacco industry denormalisation varied widely. More than half of the respondents supported regulating tobacco as a hazardous product, fining the tobacco industry for earnings from underage smoking, and suing tobacco companies for health care costs caused by tobacco. Majorities also thought that the tobacco industry is dishonest and that cigarettes are too dangerous to be sold at all. Fewer than half of the respondents thought that the tobacco industry is mostly or completely responsible for the health problems smokers have because of smoking and that tobacco companies should be sued for taxes lost from smuggling. In particular, less than a quarter thought that the tobacco industry is most responsible for young people starting to smoke. Non-smoking, knowledge about health effects caused by tobacco, and support for the role of government in health promotion were independent predictors of support for tobacco industry denormalisation.
Conclusions: Although Ontarians are ambivalent toward tobacco industry denormalisation, they are supportive of some measures. Mass media programmes aimed at increasing support for tobacco industry denormalisation and continued monitoring of public attitudes toward this strategy are needed.
Objective: To examine an industry funded and controlled study of in flight air quality (IFAQ).
Methods: Systematic search of internal tobacco industry documents available on the internet and at the British American Tobacco Guildford Depository.
Results: Individuals from several tobacco industry companies, led by Philip Morris, designed, funded, conducted, and controlled the presentation of results of a study of IFAQ for the Scandinavian airline SAS in 1988 while attempting to minimise the appearance of industry control. Industry lawyers and scientists deleted results unfavourable to the industry's position from the study before delivering it to the airline. The published version of the study further downplayed the results, particularly with regard to respirable suspended particulates. The study ignored the health implications of the results and instead promoted the industry position that ventilation could solve problems posed by secondhand smoke.
Conclusions: Sponsoring IFAQ studies was one of several tactics the tobacco industry employed in attempts to reverse or delay implementation of in-flight smoking restrictions. As a result, airline patrons and employees, particularly flight attendants, continued to be exposed to pollution from secondhand smoke, especially particulates, which the industry's own consultants had noted exceeded international standards. This case adds to the growing body of evidence that scientific studies associated with the tobacco industry cannot be taken at face value.
The purpose of this article is to provide the author's perspective on whether it is likely or feasible that those working in the health care domain will adapt and use lessons learned by those in the industrial domain. This article provides some historical perspective on the changes brought about in the industrial domain through the introduction of new technologies, including information technologies. The author discusses how industrialization catalyzed changes in health care delivery that paralleled but lagged behind those of the broader U.S. economy. The article concludes that there is ample reason for those interested in improving the quality and effectiveness of health informatics to systematically evaluate information technology strategies used in the industrial domain. Finally, it outlines some challenges for health informaticians and a number of factors that should be considered in adapting lessons from industry to the health care domain.
Literature suggests that ‘negative advertising’ is an effective way to encourage behavioral changes, but it has enjoyed limited use in public health media campaigns. However, as public health increasingly focuses on non-communicable disease prevention, negative advertising could be more widely applied. This analysis considers an illustrative case from tobacco control. Relying on internal tobacco industry documents, surveys and experimental data and drawing from political advocacy literature, we describe tobacco industry and public health research on the American Legacy Foundation’s “truth” campaign, an example of effective negative advertising in the service of public health. The tobacco industry determined that the most effective advertisements run by Legacy’s “truth” campaign were negative advertisements. Although the tobacco industry’s own research suggested that these negative ads identified and effectively reframed the cigarette as a harmful consumer product rather than focusing solely on tobacco companies, Philip Morris accused Legacy of ‘vilifying’ it. Public health researchers have demonstrated the effectiveness of the “truth” campaign in reducing smoking initiation. Research on political advocacy demonstrating the value of negative advertising has rarely been used in the development of public health media campaigns, but negative advertising can effectively communicate certain public health messages and serve to counter corporate disease promotion.
Mentally ill individuals have always smoked at high rates and continue to do so, despite public health efforts to encourage smoking cessation. In the last half century, the tobacco industry became interested in this connection, and conducted and supported psychiatric and basic science research on the mental health implications of smoking, long before most mental health professionals outside the industry investigated this issue. Initially, representatives of tobacco industry research organizations supported genetics and psychosomatic research to try to disprove findings that smoking causes lung cancer. Tobacco industry research leaders engaged with investigators because of shared priorities and interests in the brain effects of nicotine. By the 1980s, collaborative funding programs and individual company research and development teams engaged in intramural and extramural basic science studies on the neuropharmacology of nicotine. When mental health researchers outside the industry became interested in the issue of the mentally ill and smoking in the mid-1990s, they increasingly explained it in terms of a disease of nicotine addiction. Both the idea that smoking/nicotine does something positive for the mentally ill and the conclusion that it is the result of nicotine dependence have the potential to support corporate agendas (tobacco or pharmaceutical).
nicotine; schizophrenia; psychiatry; mental health; corporate–academic interactions
To analyse trial and deposition testimony of tobacco industry executives to determine how they use the concepts of “information” and “choice” and consider how these concepts are related to theoretical models of health behaviour change.
We coded and analysed transcripts of trial and deposition testimony of 14 high‐level executives representing six companies plus the Tobacco Institute. We conducted an interpretive analysis of industry executives' characterisation of the industry's role as information provider and the agency of tobacco consumers in making “choices”.
Tobacco industry executives deployed the concept of “information” as a mechanism that shifted to consumers full moral responsibility for the harms caused by tobacco products. The industry's role was characterised as that of impartial supplier of value‐free “information”, without regard to its quality, accuracy and truthfulness. Tobacco industry legal defences rely on assumptions congruent with and supported by individual rational choice theories, particularly those that emphasise individual, autonomous decision‐makers.
Tobacco control advocates and health educators must challenge the industry's preferred framing, pointing out that “information” is not value‐free. Multi‐level, multi‐sectoral interventions are critical to tobacco use prevention. Over‐reliance on individual and interpersonal rational choice models may have the effect of validating the industry's model of smoking and cessation behaviour, absolving it of responsibility and rendering invisible the “choices” the industry has made and continues to make in promoting the most deadly consumer product ever made.
corporate social responsibility; tobacco industry; rational choice theory; health belief model; corporate ethics
We explored what corporate “credibility” means to tobacco companies to determine xxxx.
We collected documents from an online tobacco industry document archive and analyzed them with an interpretive approach.
Tobacco companies conceptualized credibility not as being worthy of belief or confidence but as inspiring it. Thus, credibility was understood primarily as altering public perception of the industry. “Truth” was largely absent from tobacco industry conceptualizations of credibility, which were linked with “responsibility” and “reasonableness.” However, industry research found that the public regarded credibility and responsibility differently, expecting these to entail truth telling, advertising reductions, less harmful products, apologies for deception, making amends, or exiting the tobacco business altogether. Overall, industry credibility-building projects failed repeatedly.
Public health discourse increasingly attends to the roles of corporations in promoting disease. Industries such as tobacco and alcohol have been identified as profiting from harmful products. Yet corporations' ability to continue business as usual requires sustaining an implicit societal assent to their activities that depends on corporate `credibility.' For public health to address corporate disease promotion effectively, undermining corporate credibility may be strategically important.
Since 1996, the tobacco industry has used the 16 Cities Study conclusions that workplace secondhand tobacco smoke (SHS) exposures are lower than home exposures to argue that workplace and other smoking restrictions are unnecessary.
Our goal was to determine the origins and objectives of the 16 Cities Study through analysis of internal tobacco industry documents and regulatory agency and court records, and to evaluate the validity of the study’s conclusions.
The tobacco industry’s purpose in conducting the 16 Cities Study was to develop data showing that workplace SHS exposures were negligible, using these data to stop smoking restrictions by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The extensive involvement of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and the tobacco industry’s Center for Indoor Air Research in controlling the study was not fully disclosed. The study’s definition of “smoking workplace” included workplaces where smoking was restricted to designated areas or where no smoking was observed. This definition substantially reduced the study’s reported average SHS concentrations in “smoking workplaces” because SHS levels in unrestricted smoking workplaces are much greater than in workplaces with designated smoking areas or where no smoking occurred. Stratifying the data by home smoking status and comparing exposures by workplace smoking status, however, indicates that smoke-free workplaces would halve the total SHS exposure of those living with smokers and virtually eliminate SHS exposure for most others.
Data in the 16 Cities Study reveal that smoke-free workplaces would dramatically reduce total SHS exposure, providing significant worker and public health benefits.
16 Cities Study; Center for Indoor Air Research; environmental tobacco smoke; ETS; Occupational Safety and Health Administration; OSHA; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Roger Jenkins; secondhand tobacco smoke; SHS; smoke-free homes; smoke-free workplaces
Non-Hodgkin's lymphomas (NHLs) have been linked to proximity to industrial areas, but evidence regarding the health risk posed by residence near pollutant industries is very limited. The European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER) is a public register that furnishes valuable information on industries that release pollutants to air and water, along with their geographical location.
This study sought to explore the relationship between NHL mortality in small areas in Spain and environmental exposure to pollutant emissions from EPER-registered industries, using three Poisson-regression-based mathematical models.
Observed cases were drawn from mortality registries in Spain for the period 1994–2003. Industries were grouped into the following sectors: energy; metal; mineral; organic chemicals; waste; paper; food; and use of solvents. Populations having an industry within a radius of 1, 1.5, or 2 kilometres from the municipal centroid were deemed to be exposed. Municipalities outside those radii were considered as reference populations.
The relative risks (RRs) associated with proximity to pollutant industries were estimated using the following methods: Poisson Regression; mixed Poisson model with random provincial effect; and spatial autoregressive modelling (BYM model).
Only proximity of paper industries to population centres (>2 km) could be associated with a greater risk of NHL mortality (mixed model: RR:1.24, 95% CI:1.09–1.42; BYM model: RR:1.21, 95% CI:1.01–1.45; Poisson model: RR:1.16, 95% CI:1.06–1.27). Spatial models yielded higher estimates.
The reported association between exposure to air pollution from the paper, pulp and board industry and NHL mortality is independent of the model used. Inclusion of spatial random effects terms in the risk estimate improves the study of associations between environmental exposures and mortality.
The EPER could be of great utility when studying the effects of industrial pollution on the health of the population.
The tobacco industry has organised research institutions to generate misleading data on indoor air quality, including second-hand smoke exposure and health effects.
To describe tobacco industry involvement in the organisation and financial support of an air quality research laboratory in El Salvador.
Tobacco industry documents on the internet were systematically searched from August 2007 to February 2008 for air quality studies undertaken in El Salvador, and laboratory personnel were interviewed.
Philip Morris sought to establish a network of air quality laboratories throughout Latin America. In El Salvador, in 1997, through Tabacalera de El Salvador (a subsidiary of Philip Morris) and the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic Development (FUSADES), the industry organised an air quality research laboratory. FUSADES was part of the industry’s Latin American Scientific Network, which consisted of doctors hired as consultants who would send air samples from their research to FUSADES. Philip Morris Scientific Affairs personnel hired LabStat, a Canadian-based laboratory, to provide technical assistance to FUSADES (train and assist the laboratory in air quality measurements). In addition, the Washington-based HMS Group successfully implemented a plan to upgrade the laboratory and obtain international certifications. HMS Group also assisted in searching for sustainable funding for FUSADES, including seeking funds from international aid for Hurricane Mitch.
Air quality studies that have used the FUSADES laboratory should be carefully interpreted, given the support that this laboratory received from Philip Morris.
To document the tobacco industry's litigation strategy to impede tobacco control media campaigns.
Data were collected from news and reports, tobacco industry documents, and interviews with health advocates and media campaign staff.
RJ Reynolds and Lorillard attempted to halt California's Media Campaign alleging that the campaign polluted jury pools and violated First Amendment rights because they were compelled to pay for anti‐industry ads. The American Legacy Foundation was accused of violating the Master Settlement Agreement's vilification clause because its ads attacked the tobacco industry. The tobacco companies lost these legal challenges.
The tobacco industry has expanded its efforts to oppose tobacco control media campaigns through litigation strategies. While litigation is a part of tobacco industry business, it imposes a financial burden and impediment to media campaigns' productivity. Tobacco control professionals need to anticipate these challenges and be prepared to defend against them.
advertising; public policy, youth smoking prevention
Objective: To document the history of visits to Australia by tobacco industry sponsored scientists and news media reports about smoking and health matters generated by their visits.
Design: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of tobacco industry internal documents made available through the Master Settlement Agreement.
Results: At least nine sponsored scientists visited Australia from 1969 until 1979. The industry sought to promote the scientists as independent from the industry and on occasion, scientists publicly lied about their industry connections. The industry was sometimes delighted with the extensive and favourable media coverage given to the visits.
Conclusions: These media reports are likely to have influenced many who were exposed to them to believe that the evidence against smoking remained equivocal.
Objective: To examine (1) the extent to which cigarette companies fulfilled the promises made to consumers in the 1954 "Frank Statement", and (2) the effect of these promises on consumer knowledge, beliefs, and smoking practices.
Methods: This study reviews statements made since 1954 by the tobacco companies individually and collectively through the Tobacco Institute and Tobacco Industry Research Committee/Council for Tobacco Research on the subject of smoking as a cause disease, and the industry's pledge to support and disclose the results of impartial research on smoking and health. Many of the industry documents evaluated in this study were obtained from a collection consisting of 116 documents entitled the "Statement of Defendants' Misrepresentations" prepared by attorneys representing the state of Connecticut in the Medicaid litigation against the tobacco industry in 1998. In addition, we searched for corroborating material from tobacco industry documents collected from the tobacco industry's document websites. In order to contrast industry statements on smoking and health with what smokers' actually believed about smoking we reviewed reports of public polling data on smokers' knowledge and beliefs about smoking and disease gathered from tobacco industry sources and from surveys conducted by public health researchers.
Results: Analysis of public statements issued by the tobacco industry sources over the past five decades shows that the companies maintained the stance that smoking had not been proven to be injurious to health through 1999. The public statements of the tobacco industry are in sharp contrast to the private views expressed by many of their own scientists. The tobacco documents reveal that many scientists within the tobacco industry acknowledged as early as the 1950s that cigarette smoking was unsafe. The sincerity of the industry's promise to support research to find out if smoking was harmful to health and to disclose information about the health effects of smoking can also be questioned based upon the industry's own documents which reveal: (1) scepticism about the scientific value of the smoking and health research program established by the industry; and (2) evidence that research findings implicating smoking as a health problem were often not published or disclosed outside the industry. Industry documents also show that the companies knew that their own customers were misinformed about smoking and health issues.
Conclusion: It is clear that the cigarette companies failed to fulfill the promises made to consumers in the 1954 "Frank Statement" advertisement. The failure of cigarette manufacturers to honour these promises has resulted in a public that even today remains misinformed about the health risks of smoking.
To evaluate the processes and outcomes of tobacco litigation in Argentina and to analyse the strategies of the tobacco industry to oppose litigation using tobacco industry documents.
A systematic search of tobacco industry documents on the internet dating from 1978 to 2002. Law library searches using Argentinean official and unofficial reports systems were combined with computerised online searches.
There have been at least 15 failed litigation cases in Argentina and the tobacco industry presented a concerted defence in every claim regardless of cost. We categorised 11 cases as product liability and nicotine addiction, two as health care reimbursement, and two as criminal law and secondhand smoke. Industry strategies included hiring legal consultants from prestigious international and Argentinean law firms and developing litigation prevention programmes. Industry monitored legal academic meetings, controlled the development of new product liability legislation, obtained favourable opinions from experts, and closely observed the development of litigation in Argentina.
The strategies used by the industry have been successful in preventing recovery for tobacco injuries through litigation. Argentinean health advocates and lawyers need to be aware of the roles and strategies of the tobacco industry in order to develop effective litigation in Argentina.
Latin America; policy; litigation
Objective: To assess the effectiveness of conflict of interest disclosure policies by comparing a competing interests disclosure statement that met the requirements established by the journal in a 2003 article on health effects of secondhand smoke based on the American Cancer Society CPS-I dataset with internal tobacco industry documents describing financial ties between the tobacco industry and authors of the study.
Design: Descriptive analysis of internal tobacco industry documents retrieved from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, University of California, San Francisco.
Results: Meeting the requirements for financial disclosure established by the journal did not provide the reader with a full picture of the tobacco industry's involvement with the study authors. The tobacco industry documents reveal that the authors had long standing financial and other working relationships with the tobacco industry.
Conclusion: These findings are another example of how simply requiring authors to disclose financial ties with the tobacco industry may not be adequate to give readers (and reviewers) a full picture of the author's relationship with the tobacco industry. The documents also reveal that the industry funds research to enhance its credibility and endeavours to work with respected scientists to advance its goals. These findings question the adequacy of current journal policies regarding competing interest disclosures and the acceptability of tobacco industry funding for academic research.
Objective: To describe how the British Columbia Capital Regional District successfully passed, implemented, and enforced a 100% smokefree bylaw in all public places, including restaurants and bars, despite an aggressive campaign by the tobacco industry (acting through the hospitality industry) to stop it.
Methods: Information was obtained from news reports, internal tobacco industry documents, reports, public documents, and interviews with key players. Tobacco industry documents were accessed between February and April 2002. This project was approved by the University of California San Francisco committee on human research.
Results: As in the USA and elsewhere in the world, the tobacco industry in British Columbia, Canada, recruited and created hospitality associations to fight against the district smokefree bylaw. They used the classic industry rhetoric of individual rights and freedoms, economic devastation, and ventilation as a solution. Public health authorities were able to counter industry strategies with a strong education campaign, well written bylaws, and persistent enforcement.
Conclusion: It is possible to overcome serious opposition orchestrated by the tobacco industry and develop and implement a 100% smokefree bylaw in Canada. Doing so requires attention to detail in drafting the bylaw, as well as a public education campaign on the health dangers of secondhand smoke and active enforcement to overcome organised resistance to the bylaw. Jurisdictions considering smokefree bylaws should anticipate this opposition when developing and implementing their bylaws.
Objective: To examine the tobacco industry's strategy to avoid regulations on secondhand smoke exposure in Latin America.
Methods: Systematic search of tobacco industry documents available through the internet. All available materials, including confidential reports regarding research, lobbying, and internal memoranda exchanged between the tobacco industry representatives, tobacco industry lawyers, and key players in Latin America.
Results: In Latin America, Philip Morris International and British American Tobacco, working through the law firm Covington & Burling, developed a network of well placed physicians and scientists through their "Latin Project" to generate scientific arguments minimising secondhand smoke as a health hazard, produce low estimates of exposure, and to lobby against smoke-free workplaces and public places. The tobacco industry's role was not disclosed.
Conclusions: The strategies used by the industry have been successful in hindering development of public health programmes on secondhand smoke. Latin American health professionals need to be aware of this industry involvement and must take steps to counter it to halt the tobacco epidemic in Latin America.
To analyse the statements given by tobacco industry defence witnesses during trial testimonies and depositions in second‐hand smoke cases and in parallel, to review criticisms of epidemiology in industry‐funded publications in order to identify strategies for discrediting epidemiologic evidence on passive smoking health effects.
A collection of depositions and trial testimony transcripts from tobacco industry‐related lawsuits filed in the United States during the 1990s, was compiled and indexed by the Tobacco Deposition and Trial Testimony Archive (DATTA). Statements in DATTA made by expert witnesses representing the tobacco industry relating to the health effects of passive smoking were identified and reviewed. Industry‐supported publications within the peer‐reviewed literature were also examined for statements on exposure misclassification, meta‐analysis, and confounding.
The witnesses challenged causation of adverse health effects of passive smoking by citing limitations of epidemiologic research, raising methodological and statistical issues, and disputing biological plausibility. Though not often cited directly by the witnesses, the defence tactics mirrored the strategies used in industry‐funded reports in the peer‐reviewed literature.
The tobacco industry attempted to redirect the focus and dialogue related to the epidemiologic evidence on passive smoking. This approach, used by industry experts in trial testimony and depositions, placed bias as a certain alternative to causation of diseases related to passive smoking and proposed an unachievable standard for establishing the mechanism of disease.
tobacco industry; passive smoking; environmental tobacco smoke; ETS
Over the past two years, the US pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries were preparing themselves for passage of some type of health-reform legislation with a clear appreciation—and concern— about the enormous impact any law would be likely to have on the structure and viability of the research-based industry. Now, with final passage in March 2010 of the patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and its companion “quick-fix” and budget bill, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, it is a good time to take a look at how the industry fared and assess how the various provisions of the health-care reform bill might affect the industry’s long-term prosperity and growth.