In this work we employed TMS/EEG to measure cortical effective connectivity at the bedside of patients emerging from coma after severe brain injury. The specific aim of the present study was to develop a novel approach to detect and track the neural correlates of recovery of consciousness in non-communicating patients. This approach can complement event-related EEG potential protocols and functional MRI active paradigms because it does not rely on a subject's ability to process sensory stimuli, to understand and follow instructions or communicate; instead, it aims at gauging directly the ability of distributed thalamocortical modules to interact among each other on a millisecond time-scale, a condition that is considered critical for consciousness to emerge (
Tononi, 2004;
Laureys, 2005;
Tononi and Koch, 2008;
Alkire et al., 2008;
Seth et al., 2008). Practically, such an approach can be important because the capacity of brain-injured patients to interact with the external environment may be impeded by lesions of sensory/motor pathways and cortices, by difficulties in language comprehension (
Majerus et al., 2009) and may fluctuate significantly over time (
Monti et al., 2010b). It could prove especially useful in patients at the lower boundary of consciousness, by providing an objective biomarker that could be used to monitor and guide their rehabilitation and treatment (
Schiff, 2010;
Shah and Schiff, 2010).
As in previous studies (
Massimini et al., 2005,
2010;
Ferrarelli et al., 2010), in order to probe the ability of distributed thalamocortical modules to interact, we stimulated a subset of cortical neurons with TMS and performed EEG source modelling to detect, on a millisecond time-scale, the chain of effects triggered in the rest of the brain by this initial perturbation. Compared to methods based on the observation of resting brain activity, this perturb-and-measure approach (
Paus, 2005) readily dissociates functional connectivity (temporal correlations) from effective connectivity (causal interactions), which is defined as the ability of a subset of neurons to causally affect the activity of other groups of neurons (
Friston, 2002;
Lee et al., 2003). Recent studies have shown that by employing TMS/EEG and source modelling it is possible to detect patterns of effective connectivity that are generally predicted by main anatomical pathways (
Ilmoniemi et al., 1997;
Litvak et al., 2007;
Morishima et al., 2009;
Casali et al., 2010). On the other hand, since TMS tends to activate a large set of cortical axons in a way that is difficult to control fully (
Wagner et al., 2007), this technique is more likely to provide a coarse rather than a fine-grained estimation of effective connectivity. In the present context, a broader estimation of effective connectivity may constitute an advantage, since theoretical works (
Tononi, 2004;
Tononi and Koch, 2008), experimental data (
Maandag et al., 2007;
Alkire et al., 2008;
Shulman et al., 2009) and clinical evidence (
Markowitsch and Kessler, 2000;
Mataro et al., 2001;
Schiff, 2010) suggest that consciousness depends not so much on some specific circuits, but rather on the capacity of distributed regions of the brain to interact through divergent cortico–cortical and cortico–thalamo–cortical connections. Indeed, as demonstrated by previous experiments, TMS/EEG measures of effective connectivity can distinguish readily between conditions in which consciousness is present (alert wakefulness, dreaming) (
Massimini et al., 2005,
2010) and conditions in which consciousness is reduced, or lost (sleep and anaesthesia) (
Massimini et al., 2005;
Ferrarelli et al., 2010).
summarizes the results obtained after applying TMS in all 17 patients and shows that it is possible to discriminate reliably between a vegetative and minimally conscious state, at the single-subject level. Crucially, this discrimination was achieved in a way that is completely independent on the patient's ability to exchange information with the surrounding environment. The fact that TMS/EEG detected a clear-cut difference between vegetative state and minimally conscious state (unconsciousness versus low-level of consciousness) but not between minimally conscious state, emergence from minimally conscious state and locked-in syndrome (lower versus higher levels of consciousness) suggests that the availability of effective interactions among thalamocortical modules may be a critical mechanism that correlates closely with the presence/absence of a minimal level of consciousness. This aspect is particularly relevant if one considers that the most challenging task at the bedside is distinguishing between patients in a vegetative state and non-communicating patients in a minimally conscious state (
Majerus et al., 2005). As an example, in the present work, TMS/EEG detected the resumption of rapid, effective intracortical interactions in the brain of a patient (Patient 15) who (during Session 2) had temporarily slipped back into a clinically vegetative state, possibly due to transient fluctuations in her ability to interact with the environment; this patient was reassessed clinically as minimally conscious state and then emerged from minimally conscious state.
Clearly, validating an objective marker of consciousness that can be applied to patients that are unable to interact with the external environment is challenging by definition, since, in these cases, there is no behavioural reference to assess the presence of consciousness. In an attempt to overcome this circularity, we have previously tested TMS/EEG measures in states in which consciousness is unambiguously present [alert wakefulness (
Massimini et al., 2005), dreaming (
Massimini et al., 2010)] or unambiguously reduced [early slow wave sleep (
Massimini et al., 2005), general anaesthesia (
Ferrarelli et al., 2010)]. Here, we demonstrate that TMS/EEG measures are reliable when they are applied to brain-injured patients with a stable clinical diagnosis (Group I) and that they are sensitive in detecting a clear-cut resurgence of cortical effective connectivity in the brains of individual patients who gradually recover consciousness and functional communication (Group II). In future works, the same approach should be further tested, in a back-and-forth process, both in definite and in ambiguous clinical conditions, such as the one of Patient 15. It will be equally important to directly compare the ability of TMS/EEG to discriminate between vegetative and minimally conscious states at the individual level with the diagnostic capacity of other neurophysiological methods, such as peripherally evoked potentials (
Kotchoubey et al., 2005;
Bekinschtein et al., 2009;
Fischer et al., 2010;
Boly et al., 2011) and long-term EEG recordings (
Landsness et al., 2011). The lack of a direct comparison with other techniques represents a clear limitation of the present study and is due to logistical and time constraints (in each patient, we stimulated from two to four cortical sites) in the intensive care unit. For now, we can only compare the present results to the current literature and, in particular, to a number of works in which the mismatch negativity was evaluated systematically in patients in a vegetative state and patients in a minimally conscious state. Altogether, this body of literature suggests that, while the mismatch negativity may differ significantly between vegetative state and minimally conscious state at the group level, it does not discriminate reliably between these two conditions at the individual patient's level; in fact, this late component may be undetectable in a large proportion (up to 60%) of patients who are behaviourally in a minimally conscious state (
Kotchoubey et al., 2005;
Fischer et al., 2010;
Holler et al., 2011). Since in the present study we found consistent TMS/EEG results across sites of stimulation, in future work it will be feasible to directly compare the EEG response to TMS of a single cortical area with a battery of sensory evoked potentials (N20, mismatch negativity and P3b) recorded in the same patient, on the same day. These joint measurements will be crucial to precisely quantify the relative diagnostic power of complementary neurophysiological techniques that may enter the routine evaluation of severely brain-injured patients. To this regard, the present experiments show that, like peripheral evoked potentials, TMS-evoked potentials can be recorded at the patient's bedside, in the intensive care unit. A technical disadvantage of TMS/EEG is that it requires a more complex set-up, which includes a TMS main unit, a TMS-compatible EEG amplifier and, ideally, a navigation system in order to precisely target TMS on the cerebral cortex. Navigating TMS based on prior anatomical knowledge (CT or MRI scan) may be especially important in the assessment of brain-injured patients for two reasons. First, because it allows avoiding obvious cortical lesions and stimulating the cortical surface at supra-threshold intensity (see ‘Materials and methods’ section and
Casali et al., 2010) and second (and most important) because it ensures high test-retest reproducibility when TMS-evoked potentials are performed longitudinally (Lioumis
et al., 2009;
Casarotto et al., 2010). Hardware solutions aside, developing TMS/EEG towards routine clinical applications may require the implementation of a standard, fast data analysis procedure to calculate the spatial-temporal complexity of the cortical response to TMS.
Besides their potential diagnostic value, TMS/EEG measurements may provide novel insights on the physiopathology of disorders of consciousness as well as a valuable marker to guide rehabilitation and treatment (Giacino
et al., 2006;
Shah and Schiff, 2010). In patients in a vegetative state, who were aroused but unaware, TMS failed to trigger complex, long-range activations pointing to a dissociation between arousal and the mechanisms of thalamocortical integration. In patients in a vegetative state caused by anoxia (Patients 4 and 17) no significant EEG responses could be elicited, even when TMS was delivered at high intensity at multiple stimulation sites ( and
Supplementary Fig. 4), consistent with an extensive necrosis of the cerebral cortex (
Kinney and Samuels, 1994). In non-anoxic patients in a vegetative state TMS elicited, at both frontal and parietal sites, a strong response that remained local (, ,
Supplementary Fig. 2 and
3) corroborating the notion that the brain of these patients may retain islands of cortex (including associative areas) that are responsive, but reciprocally disconnected (
Schiff et al., 2002;
Laureys et al., 2004). According to post-mortem (
Adams et al., 2000) and
in vivo (
Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2011) neuropathological studies, this disconnection is primarily structural and may be largely due to widespread injury of cortico–cortical fibres but also to thalamic damage, leading to a substantial impairment of cortico–thalamo–cortical circuits. Notably, the present results indicate that, in addition to the anatomical damage, functional disturbances in thalamocortical networks may play a significant role. Indeed, in non-anoxic patients in a vegetative state TMS triggered a slow wave similar to the one recorded during sleep (
Massimini et al., 2005,
2007) and anaesthesia (
Ferrarelli et al., 2010) suggesting that, besides structural lesions and disconnections, functional alterations such as disfacilitation (
Englot et al., 2010), network bistability (
Massimini et al., 2009b) and altered excitation–inhibition balance (
Schiff, 2010), may contribute to the overall impairment of effective connectivity. These alterations were possibly reversed in the patients of Group II in whom repeated TMS/EEG measurements revealed a resumption of fast, long-range interactions, which paralleled recovery of consciousness; further measurements should be performed, longitudinally, at the bedside of patients who recuperate spontaneously and in patients who undergo pharmacological treatment (
Brefel-Courbon et al., 2007), or protocols of neuromodulation (
Schiff et al., 2007), in order to gain better insight on the mechanisms of recovery of consciousness after brain injury.