If the full psychiatric syndrome of depression cannot be recapitulated in rodents or nonhuman primates, then is it worthwhile to infer anything at all from animal models of depression? While symptoms such as guilt, suicidality and sad mood are likely to be purely human features, other aspects of the depressive syndrome have been replicated in laboratory animals, and in several instances ameliorated with antidepressant treatment. These include measures of helplessness, anhedonia, behavioral despair and other neurovegetative changes such as alterations in sleep and appetite patterns. From an evolutionary perspective, depression has been proposed to be an analog of the
involuntary defeat strategy (IDS), which is triggered when an animal perceives defeat in a hierarchical struggle for resources (
Sloman 2008). Features of psychomotor retardation, hyperarousal, anhedonia and sleep disturbances in the setting of losing such a struggle are postulated to have an adaptive advantage in that they serve to protect losers from further attack and focus cognitive assets on planning ways out of complex social problems (
Nesse 2000;
Watson and Andrews 2002). Most, if not all, animal models of depression aim to quantitatively assay some form of experimentally induced
defeat or
despair, even though this aspect of mammalian behavior is likely
physiological (i.e., adaptive) rather than
pathological. In addition, while despair behavior is often extrapolated as being
depression-like, the application of stress to rodents also produces
anxiety-like changes that are manifestations of the
fight or
flight response (reduced exploration, freezing, stress-induced hyperthermia, etc.). Just as anxiety and depression often overlap clinically, the distinction between stress-induced
depression-like and
anxiety-like behaviors is difficult to ascertain, particularly since both types of behaviors respond to antidepressants. Thus, an important challenge of the field has been to produce a long-lasting state of depressive pathology in laboratory animals, which has seldom been achieved.
Today’s depression models are often evaluated by fulfilling three main criteria (a)
face validity (the requirement for a reasonable degree of symptomatic homology), (b)
construct (or
etiological) validity (the requirement for similar causative factors), and (c)
pharmacological validity (which requires the reversal of depressive symptoms by available antidepressants). These criteria serve as guides to compare models against each other, but each criterion suffers basic flaws (
Nestler and Hyman 2010). For instance, in the olfactory bulbectomy model of depression, surgically bulbectomized adult rats display increased locomotor activity, increased aggression, and spatial memory impairments that are all reversed by the chronic administration of a diverse array of antidepressants (
Song and Leonard 2005). While this model may appear to be weak in construct and face validity, its pharmacological validity is excellent: virtually all classes of available antidepressants reverse these behavioral changes with a therapeutic delay. Of course, people with depression do not have olfactory lesions. Nevertheless, our assessment of poor construct validity is of limited value, since the etiology of depression is incompletely understood. Strict applications of face validity pose the risk of excessive anthropomorphization, particularly when assessing rodents such as mice, rats or tree shrews, which each have their own distinct behavioral repertoires (
Crawley 2000). Since candidate models of depression are often assessed for reversibility with known monoamine-based antidepressants, there exists the alarming possibility that the most popular models of depression may, by design, be insensitive to the antidepressant effects of nonmonoamine-based agents (
Berton and Nestler 2006). A potential fourth criterion is
pathological validity, whereby animal models are validated by their recapitulation of known postmortem pathological or serological changes found in human depressed patients. Given our current state of knowledge, this is a very difficult requirement, but with increasing efforts in this field stemming from more widespread access to human postmortem tissue, the elucidation of pathological validity criteria may potentially eliminate the circular arguments that lie at the core of modeling depression.
This chapter evaluates the current status of animal models in depression and highlights certain novel neurobiological insights which have been generated using these models. Given the emphasis on molecular perspectives, we focus on data from rodent studies. Preclinical studies in nonhuman primates have largely focused on the behavioral and endocrinological impacts of early life stress (
Gilmer and McKinney 2003) and, while this is clearly a critical research avenue, this field has been limited by a variety of factors which restrict nonhuman primate research. Instead of attempting to be comprehensive, this review highlights key methodological strengths and limitations and provides recommendations for further experimentation. The reader is referred elsewhere for a recent systematic and concise description of the neurobiology of depression (
Krishnan and Nestler 2010).