The cornerstone of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative is immunization of children with multiple doses of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), via both routine immunization (RI) and supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) [
1]. The key advantages of OPV are ease of administration and efficient induction of mucosal immunity, thereby limiting poliovirus shedding and person-to-person transmission [
2]. Through widespread implementation of this approach and with standardized virologic surveillance, indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission has stopped in all but 4 countries (Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India) [
1]. WPV type 2 (WPV2) circulation apparently stopped in Africa in the mid-1990s (F. Adu and C. Koffi; unpublished data), and WPV2 was last detected (in India) in 1999 [
3].
Despite its advantages, OPV use carries the infrequent risks of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis among OPV recipients and their direct contacts [
2] and the emergence of genetically divergent vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) [
4,
5], both a consequence of selection against the attenuated phenotype during intestinal replication [
6]. VDPVs are operationally defined as OPV-related isolates having >1% nucleotide (nt) sequence divergence from the parental OPV strain in the ~900-nt region encoding the major capsid surface protein, VP1 [
4,
5]. This arbitrary demarcation represents ~1 year of poliovirus (PV) replication after administration of the initiating OPV dose [
7], substantially longer than the normal postvaccination excretion period of 4–6 weeks [
2,
8]. VDPVs are further categorized as circulating (cVDPVs) when there is clear evidence of transmission beyond close contacts [
4,
5]. cVDPV outbreaks have occurred in settings of widening susceptibility to ≥1 poliovirus serotype in association with weak RI programs and in locations where the corresponding WPVs of the same serotype have been eliminated [
4,
5,
9,
10]. The risk of cVDPV emergence appears to be highest for the Sabin type 2 (Sabin 2) OPV strain [
4,
5,
10], particularly in areas with high densities of nonimmune persons, poor sanitation, and tropical or subtropical climates [
11].
Northern Nigeria had remained a major reservoir for WPV1 and WPV3 [
12,
13], leading to extensive international spread of WPV1 in 2003–2006 [
14] and 2008–2009 [
13,
15] and limited WPV3 international spread in 2008–2009 [
13,
15]. Low trivalent OPV (tOPV) coverage in the RI program, suspension of SIAs in some states in 2003–2004, and low coverage in SIAs have contributed to ongoing WPV transmission [
14]. To more efficiently stop WPV1 and WPV3 transmission, monovalent OPV type 1 (mOPV1) was regularly used in SIAs starting in March 2006, and mOPV3 was intermittently used starting in July 2007 [
12,
13]. During the period July 2005–June 2010, 11 of 34 SIA rounds in northern Nigeria used tOPV, including only 4 rounds during the period March 2006–April 2009.
In 2002, a case involving VDPV type 2 (VDPV2) was detected in Plateau state, but no related cases involving VDPV2 or any other VDPVs were detected over the next 4 years [
16]. In August 2006, virologic investigations detected a cluster of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases associated with Sabin 2-related isolates in northern Nigeria; sequence analysis revealed that the isolates were VDPVs [
17]. Retrospective analyses found an early outbreak isolate in 2005, and continued screening through mid-2010 detected a total of 315 VDPV2 case isolates. We found an additional 21 cases with “pre-VDPV2” isolates (0.5%–1% VP1 divergent from Sabin 2), sporadically found in settings of high OPV coverage.
Here, we describe epidemiologic characteristics of the outbreak of cVDPV2 infection in Nigeria during the period from July 2005 through 30 June 2010, constituting the largest and second-longest known cVDPV-associated outbreak [
5,
17-
21]. Furthermore, in accord with the findings of Jenkins et al [
21], we compare clinical features of both VDPV2- and pre-VDPV2–associated cases with WPV and non-polio AFP (NP-AFP) cases. We then assess risks of the emergence and spread of cVDPV2 in northern Nigeria and discuss measures needed to prevent further cVDPV outbreaks.