This is the first study to examine the neural correlates of individual differences in pain-related anxiety and fear. Three important relationships between individual variability in fear of pain, anxiety sensitivity, and brain activation were revealed.
First, activation in two pain processing regions identified in the overall contrast of painful heat and non-painful warmth—the anterior and posterior cingulate—correlated with FPQ scores, whereas ASI scores did not correlate with activation of any regions identified in this contrast. Anterior cingulate has been associated with pain and pain affect (
Coghill et al., 1999;
Peyron et al., 2000;
Rainville et al., 2002) and with evaluation of emotional stimuli more generally (
Davidson & Irwin, 1999;
Ochsner and Feldman Barrett, 2001;
Phillips et al., 2003), and is thought to monitor ongoing processing to signal when something is ‘wrong’ enough to require an alteration in behavior (
Botvinick et al., 2001;
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004;
Ochsner and Feldman Barrett, 2001). In this context, pain may be a primitive signal for behavioral change—although more complex circumstances may elicit the signal as well (
Botvinick et al., 2001;
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004;
Ochsner et al., 2001,
2002). The posterior cingulate has been associated with evaluating the valence of external and potentially threatening stimuli (Maddock et al., 1997Maddock et al., 2003). Recruitment of anterior and posterior cingulate cortices may suggest that individuals high in fear of pain closely monitor and evaluate the potential threat value of a painful stimulus.
Second, a regression analysis identified additional regions that correlated even more strongly with ASI and FPQ scores. This analysis correlated questionnaire scores with actvation in the pain>warmth contrast for all voxels in cingulate and frontal regions of interest. Such analyses allow identification of regions whose activation co-varies with individual difference measures, but may be lost in overall group contrasts that average activations for high and low scorers.
FPQ scores predicted activation of right lateral orbital prefrontal cortex (OFC). In prior work, activation of ventrolateral/orbitofrontal cortex has been observed during pain (
Lorenz et al., 2003;
Lotze et al., 2001;
Rolls et al., 2003;
Tracey et al., 2000) and during affective states more generally—including induced depressed mood (
Baker et al., 1997), anger (
Kimbrell et al., 1999), when sensing pleasant tastes (
O’Doherty, et al., 2001,
2001), and when receiving rewards (Rogers et al., 1999;
O’Doherty et al., 2001) or punishments (
O’Doherty, Kringelbach et al., 2001,
O’Doherty, Kringelbach et al., 2003) for choices in a computerized game. Other work suggests that this region may track changes in the motivational value of stimuli and guide response selection accordingly. Thus, OFC lesions impair alteration or inhibition of a prepotent response to a previously reinforced stimulus (
Rolls et al., 1994), and activation of this region is found when participants must inhibit or select among competing responses (
Barch et al., 2001;
Cunningham et al., 2004;
Kiehl et al., 2000;
Nobre et al., 1999;
O’Doherty et al., 2003), including the down-regulation of negative emotion via cognitive reappraisal (
Ochsner et al., 2004b) or pain via cognitive distraction (
Bantick et al., 2002;
Petrovic et al., 2000), or placebo (
Lieberman et al., 2004;
Petrovic et al., 2002;
Wager et al., 2004). Right lateral OFC activity may therefore reflect attempts by fearful individuals to evaluate and/or regulate possible responses to the painful stimulus (
Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Anterior and posterior cingulate cortex, discussed above, may signal the presence of threatening levels of pain and trigger regulatory processes implemented in OFC (
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004;
Ochsner & Gross, 2005).
ASI scores, which index the tendency to feel anxious about the negative implications of bodily sensations, predicted activation of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). In prior work, this region of MPFC has been implicated in self-reflective and self-regulatory processes that might be related to the kinds of self-focused attention and anxiety measured by the ASI. Thus, this region of MPFC has been implicated in judging how well trait words describe one’s self (
Kelley et al., 2002) and/or others (
Mitchell et al., 2002;
Ochsner et al., in press), processing emotional cues (Bush at al, 1997;
Mohanty et al., 2005), and motivating responses (
Wager et al., 2005), judging (
Gusnard et al., 2001;
Ochsner et al., 2004a) or becoming distant from (
Ochsner et al., 2004b) one’s emotional state, rumination (
Ray et al., 2005), depression (
Drevets, 2000), and has been hypothesized to support a default state of self-monitoring present when participants are not explicitly directed to engage in a specific task (
Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). Notably, ASI scores for our participants were somewhat low compared to previously observed means for non-clinical undergraduate populations (
Reiss et al., 1986). This might suggest that even at low overall levels of anxiety sensitivity, higher ASI scores may predict engagement of mechanisms supporting self-focused attention and monitoring of one’s internal state. It remains for future work, however, to determine whether the same findings will be observed in individuals with higher mean ASI scores, although the association of MPFC with induced anxiety (
Simpson et al., 2001) and PTSD (e.g.
Bremner et al., 1999) suggests that it might be likely. Taken together, the present and prior findings dovetail to suggest that MPFC supports self-focused elaboration of the negative personal implications of pain that may characterize individuals high in anxiety sensitivity (
Reiss et al., 1986).
Third and last, the relationships of ASI and FPQ scores to brain activation cannot be explained wholly by differences in either of two potential confounding factors. The first is generalized trait anxiety as indexed by STAI-T scores (
Spielberger et al., 1983). Critically, STAI-T scores were not correlated with activation of any brain regions. The second concerned the fact that, across participants, different temperatures were used to obtain equal levels of subjectively experienced thermal pain. This raises the possibility that differences in the absolute magnitude of thermal stimulation could at least partially underlie the brain-behavior relationships reported here. However, we found that the significant relationships reported in were not substantially impacted when differences in temperature thresholds were removed statistically. This suggests that the psychological interpretation or appraisal of pain—which presumably results in the subjective experience of pain—is what may be associated with pain-related fear and anxiety.
The present findings may have important implications for at least four domains of research. First, the identification of regions recruited by individuals high in pain-related fear and anxiety may help explain variability in medial and orbital frontal activation across studies examining pain (
Lorenz et al., 2003;
Lotze et al., 2001;
Peyron et al., 2000;
Rolls et al., 2003) and also may help clarify abnormal patterns of cingulate, medial and orbital frontal activation in chronic pain (
Grachev et al., 2002; Apkarian et al., 2001,
2003). To the extent that anxiety and worry exacerbate chronic or current pain, greater activation of these systems may be observed. More broadly, identifying neural markers for anxiety and fear may be relevant to the study of individuals with psychiatric conditions, such as panic disorder, that are characterized by anxiety about bodily sensations (
McNally, 2002).
Second, the involvement of MPFC and OFC in pain-related fear and anxiety broadens our understanding of the functional roles that these brain systems play in emotion. The present study extends prior work associating medial prefrontal cortex with an anxious state during anticipation of pain (
Sawamoto et al., 2000;
Simpson et al., 2001) by demonstrating that trait differences in anxiety predict MPFC recruitment when a painful stimulus is present. Similarly, OFC lesions have been shown to diminish fear of the consequences of socially inappropriate behavior (
Beer et al., 2003;
Davidson et al., 2001), and the association of OFC with fear of pain may suggest a broader role for this region in other types of fear-related processing.
Third, the fact that anxiety sensitivity and fear of pain correlate with activation of distinct brain regions that have been associated with different self-reflective and regulatory and functions may suggest that the ASI and FPQ tap into different psychological constructs. This possibility was suggested by
Keogh et al. (2001), who found that FPQ but not ASI scores predicted a failure to deflect attention away from pain-related cues.
Fourth, gender differences may influence attention to, elaboration of, and emotional responses to pin and other life events (
Kring & Gordon, 1998;
Keogh & Herdenfeldt, 2002;
Keogh et al., 2004), which may be reflected in the differential recruitment of brain systems (
Hamann & Canli, 2004;
Wager & Ochsner, 2005). Although the present study did not observe significant differences in either pain behavior or brain activation—very possibly due to a small sample—it will be important for future work to examine this issue more closely.
Finally, it is important to note that although the present study provides new insights into the routes by which anxiety and fear may modulate the activity of attentional and regulatory systems during the experience of pain, it does not clarify exactly why or how this modulation occurs. Information about causal mechanisms awaits studies examining the active self-regulation of pain.