Accepting the risk of offending the specialists, we judge virus taxonomy to be nothing but the very important effort to group a particularly large set of objects, namely viruses, into categories, aiming to illustrate tangible relationships among them, as well as to simplify communication among international scientists. To quote Condit: “…all of nature is a continuum, and the business of taxonomy has the obligation of drawing boundaries within this continuum, an artificial and illogical task, but necessary nevertheless” [
13].
The usefulness of classification should be obvious. To build on one of van Regenmortel's analogies [
42]: although there are de facto millions of colors, most people get by in daily life by knowing the names of fewer than a dozen. The majority of people have a distinct idea of what is meant when somebody refers to a “green” object, although the exact color referred to (which shade of green) remains undefined. Modern taxonomic schemes are frameworks in which different classes are arranged hierarchically. The classes themselves are created to roughly reflect the evolutionary connection of their members [
21]. They make use of hierarchical categories (the taxonomic classes), such as domains or kingdoms at the higher levels and genera and species at the lower levels, to allow for an even more precise way of conversation. Ideally, a taxonomic scheme is established in a way that allows the majority of experts in the pertaining field to extrapolate a sophisticated profile of a novel organism only based on its taxonomic description. For instance, zoologists should have a distinct idea of what is meant when a researcher reports the discovery of a hitherto unrecognized green “rabbit.” In this particular case, a novel living object, namely an actual mammal, would have certain characteristics that it shares with other known mammals. All of these known animals had been placed by taxonomists into a category, namely the mammalian family “Leporidae,” for which the common vernacular name is “rabbits/hares” (note that it is not “
the rabbits/hares”).
In his most recent book, Dawkins beautifully describes the dilemma of classifying forms of life. Paraphrasing Mayr's statement that “[b]iology…is plagued by its own version of essentialism…,” Dawkins elaborates that “[t]he rabbits that we see are wan shadows of the perfect ‘idea’ of rabbit, the ideal, essential Platonic rabbit, hanging somewhere out in conceptual space… Flesh-and-blood rabbits may vary, but their variations are always to be seen as flawed deviations from the ideal essence of rabbit” [
14]. Dawkins used these sentences to explain that nature (i.e. tangible reality) is different from human attempts at categorizing it, but with them he also explained the concept of a taxonomic class clearer than most taxonomists: although there are many different varieties of rabbit we (hopefully) recognize a rabbit as such even if it is one never seen before because it satisfies our criteria for the idea of rabbit. Nobody would hunt an idea, inject an idea, cuddle an idea, or feed an idea. One could do that with the actual newly discovered animal, however.
The difference between idea and physical entity is the clearer to people the wider the delineations of the taxonomic class are cast. Most children can follow the idea of animals (kingdom Animalia) or plants (kingdom Plantae). Most high-schoolers understand the idea of mammals (the animal class Mammalia). The problem is that the lower the class in a taxonomic ranking scheme, the more sophisticated its definition. This explains why quite a few people make the error of grouping rabbits, hares, and pikas (order Lagomorpha) with rodents (order Rodentia). It is even more difficult for them to understand the difference between rabbits/hares (family Leporidae) and pikas (family Ochotonidae). Only dedicated rabbit aficionados are able to differentiate the 11 leporid genera [
47] (or disagree on the number 11) and only experts can differentiate members of various rabbit species. However, this increase in complexity of categorical ranks does not change the fact that all of them, including species, remain ideas. Hence, it follows that, if a taxonomist determined the newly found green rabbit to be a member of the species
Oryctolagus cuniculus, that
Oryctolagus cuniculus could still not be hunted, injected, cuddled or fed.
Oryctolagus cuniculus would also not be green, the rabbit at hand would be. The green color would be a very unusual trait for a rabbit, but it would not change the fact that the animal is a member of
Oryctolagus cuniculus as long as this green animal still fulfills the definition of rabbit experts for that particular leporid species. In other words, “[a] species taxon has spatiotemporal referents in the form of organisms, which are the actual instances that satisfy the membership conditions of the [taxonomic] class” [
45]. From this, it logically follows that taxa only can be established, discussed, or defined (since they are ideas), whereas the actual organisms only can be described, or identified. A species cannot go extinct (except if humanity develops amnesia) but it can cease to have members when those go extinct. A species also cannot be discovered (except if amnesia gets reversed), but a newly discovered organism can require the creation of a new species. On the other hand, an organism cannot be defined because it exists as it is [
39].
Virus taxonomy is organized similarly to animal taxonomy (although the highest taxonomic class in virus taxonomy is currently that of the order) but it is more difficult to grasp because viruses (or, properly, virions) are not everyday objects that can be seen and touched. The notion that broader categories can be grasped more easily than more narrow ones holds true for virus taxonomy as well. While non-virologists are probably lost even at the level of order, virologists should have a distinct idea of what is meant when a colleague reports the discovery of a hitherto undetected member of the order
Mononegavirales that induces green fluorescence in infected cells. Accordingly, a virologist would assume that a novel object, namely the novel virus, would have a monopartite single-stranded RNA genome of negative polarity, a genome with the characteristic organization 3′ -UTR-
N-G-L-5′-UTR, and that its virions would be enveloped. These characteristics, among important others, such as natural host range, had been used by virus taxonomists to define the virus order
Mononegavirales [
28–
30]. The most precise vernacular name is “mononegavirads” (note that it is not “
the mononegavirads”) [
46]. Some virologists might know the differences between the mononegavirad families
Borna-
viridae, Filoviridae, Paramyxoviridae, and
Rhabdoviridae [
29]. Fewer are educated in the intricacies of different paramyxovirid genera. Experts would be called upon to assign this novel virus to a particular paramyxovirid species,
Measles virus for instance. Again, the increase in complexity of categorical ranks does not change the fact that all of them, including species, remain ideas. Neither the species
Measles virus nor the family
Paramyxoviridae could be injected, centrifuged, isolated, or visualized by electron microscopy. The species
Measles virus would also not induce green fluorescence in infected cells—the virus at hand would. Thorough investigation might reveal that the novel virus is in fact
a measles virus (and not the measles virus)––because, of course, there are several, but this measles virus would never be the species Measles
virus. A variant or
type designation would then be assigned to the novel virus to differentiate it during communication from other variants. If the novel measles virus remains phenotypically different, i.e. inducing green fluorescence, over generations then the new variant could be elevated to
strain, which “…is a biological variant of a given virus that is recognizable because it possesses some unique phenotypic characteristics that remain stable under natural conditions” [
42]. It is important to remember this definition as currently many laboratory virologists use the words isolates, variants, and strains indiscriminately. A strain is always a variant, but a variant is most often not a strain. Both strains and variants are represented by isolates (experimental material corresponding to an instance of a given virus). Two isolates of the same variant, for instance isolated at two different time points during infection from the same animal, can be identical or different in sequence [
44] because of the presence of a quasispecies, i.e. a mixture of related genotypes that exist in an environment of high mutation rate, in the animal (note that the word quasispecies does not have a taxonomic connotation and in fact is unrelated to the term species). Measles isolates, variants, and strains are physical entities. Therefore, they can be described, identified, or discovered. They can also be centrifuged or injected into animals. Importantly, they cannot be defined. The species
Measles virus, on the other hand, cannot emerge, be isolated, or be identified. However, it can be (and currently is) defined [
22]. From this, it follows that the definition of taxa such as species are a “…matter of opinion and adjudication rather than logical necessity” [
43,
45], i.e. species demarcation criteria differ drastically among the different established categories of viruses depending on currently available information. In biological classifications, species cannot be defined as immutable natural kinds in terms of necessary and sufficient properties as is done in physics and chemistry. Species are
invented by the ICTV Study Groups who
stipulate species demarcation criteria. This also means that species can be dissolved or absorbed by other taxa, whereas actual viruses remain what they are––only their descriptions and designations can be can changed.