Along with well-documented abnormalities in social interaction, communication, perception and attention (
Frith, 2003), a large number of recent studies have provided evidence for disruption of executive functions in autism spectrum disorders (ASD; see e.g.
Hill, 2004a,b;
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991;
Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999;
Russell, 1997; Russo et al., 2007). Functional neuroimaging studies have also pointed towards atypical brain activity in participants with ASD when performing executive function tasks (e.g.
Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Minshew, 2007;
Luna et al., 2002; Schmitz et al., 2006). However, evidence from different studies has not always been consistent. In part, this mixed evidence may be accounted for by methodological issues such as the heterogeneity of the patient groups studied and the most appropriate ways of matching patient with control groups (
Hill, 2004a,b). However, another explanation may be the heterogeneity of the processes referred to as ‘executive functions’ (
Hill & Bird, 2006). Executive function is an umbrella term encompassing a wide range of high-level processes for controlling and organising behaviour, such as planning, inhibition, multitasking, monitoring and so on (
Burgess, 1997;
Gilbert & Burgess, 2008;
Monsell, 1996; Shallice, 1988;
Stuss & Knight, 2002). There is therefore no reason to suppose that performance on one test of executive function should necessarily mirror performance on another. Indeed, correlational studies have suggested that although there are often significant correlations between scores on various tests of executive function, these correlations tend to be rather low (typically
r < 0.4;
Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 1997;
Obonsawin et al., 2002). Moreover, factor analysis reveals the presence of multiple distinct factors in scores derived from batteries of executive function tests (e.g.
Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998;
Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000).
Although the frontal lobes, and particularly the prefrontal cortex, have long been recognised as playing an important role in higher-level control (e.g.
Luria, 1966;
Penfield & Evans, 1935;
Shallice, 1982), only recently have neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies begun to delineate distinct regions of prefrontal cortex supporting different aspects of executive function. In part, the evidence for such distinctions originated from studies of patients with frontal lobe lesions, who experienced behavioural disorganisation in everyday life with such severity that they were unable to return to work at their previous level, yet performed well on classical tests of executive function such as the Stroop task (
Stroop, 1935), Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST;
Grant & Berg, 1948), Tower of London (
Shallice, 1982), verbal fluency (
Benton, 1968) and so on.
Shallice and Burgess (1991) designed two new tasks – the “Multiple Errands Test” and “Six Element Test” – that were sensitive to deficits in three patients with frontal lobe lesions, who performed other tests of executive function within normal limits. Subsequent studies have suggested that these tasks, which depend upon behavioural organisation within relatively ill-constrained or ill-structured situations (i.e. multitasking), are particularly sensitive to lesions within the rostral prefrontal cortex, approximating Brodmann Area (BA) 10 (
Burgess, 2000;
Burgess, Veitch, Costello, & Shallice, 2000; see also
Goel & Grafman, 2000).
Intriguingly, recent evidence suggests that executive deficits in high-functioning adults with ASD may be particularly apparent in new tests of executive function involving multitasking, rather than more constrained classical tests of executive function.
Hill and Bird (2006) tested 22 high-functioning participants with ASD and 22 well-matched controls (matched on an individual basis) on a battery of executive function tests. Although there were no significant differences between the groups on standard tests of executive function (e.g. Stroop, WCST, verbal fluency), newer tests did distinguish the two groups, with abnormal behaviour in the ASD group being particularly apparent on the Six Element Test (SET).
Given the variability in results from previous studies (
Hill, 2004a,b) it may be premature to point to a particular executive function test, or set of tests, that best distinguish participants with ASD from control participants. However, a consistent finding has been that participants with ASD tend to show deficits on only a restricted set of executive function tests, with preserved or superior performance in other domains (
Hill & Bird, 2006;
Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997). This contrasts with other populations, who may be more likely to show more widespread deficits, such as those with schizophrenia (
Bilder et al., 2000). The uneven profile of performance seen in studies that have investigated executive functions in ASD argues against a “deficit model” of the processing differences between participants with ASD and controls, and instead suggests that ASD may be better characterised by disruption or reorganisation of specific brain systems, rather than more generalised impairment (
Minshew et al., 1997).
One candidate brain region that may show such disruption or reorganisation in ASD is medial rostral PFC, corresponding approximately to the medial part of Brodmann Area 10 and the adjacent “paracingulate” region (
Frith & Frith, 2003). This region has been implicated in both structural (
Abell et al., 1999) and functional (
Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002) change in ASD (see
Schmitz et al., 2006 for further evidence from a study that combined structural and functional imaging approaches). Furthermore, it has been argued that this area is involved in multitasking (
Burgess et al., 2000;
Burgess, Dumontheil, Gilbert, Okuda, et al., 2007) and mentalizing, or theory of mind (
Frith & Frith, 2003), both of which have been suggested to be compromised in ASD (
Hill & Bird, 2006;
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).
Recently,
Burgess, Simons, Dumontheil, and Gilbert (2005) and
Burgess, Dumontheil, and Gilbert (2007) have argued that particular regions of rostral PFC play an important role in selection between stimulus-oriented and stimulus-independent thought, i.e. attentional selection between current perceptual input versus self-generated information. Several recent neuroimaging studies have suggested that this form of attentional selection is supported by rostral PFC (
Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2005;
Gilbert, Simons, Frith, & Burgess, 2006a;
Gilbert, Williamson, et al., 2007). For example, in a study by
Gilbert et al. (2005), participants performed three separate tasks that could either be accomplished by attending to task-relevant visual information (during “stimulus-oriented phases”), or by performing the same task “in their heads” (during “stimulus-independent phases”). Consistently across the three tasks, medial rostral PFC (approximating BA 10) showed greater activity throughout stimulus-oriented phases, compared with stimulus-independent phases. This finding is of particular relevance for understanding the brain mechanisms supporting multitasking. Tests of multitasking depend heavily on the ability to organise behaviour according to previously formed plans that are not immediately cued by the environment (i.e. prospective memory). For instance, in the SET, participants must perform the individual subtasks whilst at the same time maintaining an intention to switch between tasks in the future. In such situations, participants must bear in mind an internally represented intention to act whilst also monitoring events in the external environment as part of the ongoing tasks. It therefore seems likely that multitasking will depend critically on the ability to flexibly deploy attention between the external environment and internal representations (
Burgess, Dumontheil, Gilbert, Okuda, et al., 2007). On this evidence, it seems possible that executive tasks stressing this form of attentional selection may be particularly sensitive to atypical information processing in ASD.
In the present study, we therefore investigated performance of participants with ASD performing two tests of executive function: one that is a more standard test, and one that requires switching between stimulus-oriented and stimulus-independent thought. For the standard test of executive function we chose a random response generation task. Random generation tasks have a long history of investigation within cognitive psychology (e.g.
Baddeley, 1966). Such tasks place demands on executive functions in at least two respects. First, random generation may require participants to switch flexibly between different sequence-generation strategies (because using the same strategy for too long would lead to stereotyped responding). Second, it may be necessary to inhibit prepotent response tendencies, such as sequential cycling through the response options (
Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998). Neuroimaging studies have indicated widespread prefrontal and premotor activity associated with random generation tasks (e.g.
Jahanshahi, Dirnberger, Fuller, & Frith, 2000). In addition, it has been shown that disruption of dorsolateral PFC activity with transcranial magnetic stimulation leads to an increase in stereotypical responding in such tasks (
Jahanshahi et al., 1998). However, random generation tasks are not believed to depend critically on the functions of medial rostral PFC. The second executive function test used in the present study was a version of one of the tasks investigated by
Gilbert et al. (2005), involving selection between stimulus-oriented and stimulus-independent thought. This task may index cognitive processes that also play a role in more complex situations, such as those involving prospective memory or behavioural organisation in ill-structured circumstances (
Burgess, Dumontheil, Gilbert, Okuda, et al., 2007). We expected activity in medial rostral PFC to be particularly associated with the stimulus-oriented phases of this task.