The recent emergence of social cognitive neuroscience has allowed psychological constructs such as empathy to be redefined based on neuroscientific evidence. In a recent review,
Decety and Jackson (2004) examine converging lines of evidence from lesion and functional neuroimaging studies suggesting empathy derives from three main cognitive processes. In the first step, the other's emotion is ‘shared’, activating brain areas involved in subjective emotional experience such as the inferior frontal cortex, superior temporal cortex, amygdala, right somatosensory cortex, right temporal pole and right insula (
Reiman et al., 1997;
Carr et al., 2003). Second, one recognizes that the initiating agent of this subjective emotional experience is the other, not oneself. This ability to determine that the source of an internally represented emotion or intended goal is located outside of oneself requires perspective-taking (PT), which appears to be mediated by a brain circuit including the medial prefrontal cortex (
Gallagher and Frith, 2003). This process also requires the capacity to assign agency, which is likely mediated by the heteromodal association area at the junction of the temporal, parietal and occipital lobes (
Farrer et al., 2003;
Ruby and Decety, 2003,
2004;
Saxe and Wexler, 2005). Finally, the ability to accurately infer the other's perspective requires the intentional suppression of one's own viewpoint (
Keysar et al., 2003;
Royzman et al., 2003;
Van Boven and Loewenstein, 2003;
Bernstein et al., 2004). Both functional and developmental lesion studies in humans suggest that the frontal pole, approximately corresponding to Brodmann's area (BA) 10, may perform this regulatory function, actively inhibiting the self-perspective in order to allow the other's perspective to be considered (
Anderson et al., 1999;
Moll et al., 2001;
Ruby and Decety, 2003,
2004;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003,
2005a).
While functional imaging of healthy controls is necessary to identify the functional circuits involved in empathy (
Farrow et al., 2001;
Decety and Chaminade, 2003;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005b; Vollm
et al., 2005;
Singer et al., 2006), only complementary data from human lesion studies can provide information about the relative importance of particular structures in those circuits, essentially demonstrating which structures are required for normal empathy in real-life situations and which are not. Many neuropsychiatric disorders are associated with deficits in empathy, including schizophrenia, Asperger's syndrome, sociopathy, post-traumatic brain injury and stroke. However, only a few studies have quantified brain–empathy correlations in patient groups (
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003,
2005a), and many studies do not measure empathy by measuring the subjects' typical, real-life engagement in empathic behaviour.
A group of diseases that is of particular interest to the question of how brain damage leads to loss of empathy are neurodegenerative conditions that occur after normal social development has been established. Loss of empathy is an early and central symptom of frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD), a focal neurodegenerative disorder involving primarily the frontal and temporal lobes. FTLD patients with predominantly temporal damage show dramatically increased interpersonal coldness (
Rankin et al., 2003) and have pathologically low levels of cognitive and emotional empathy, while FTLD patients with primarily frontal atrophy seem to lose the capacity for empathic PT, but do not become significantly colder as a group. Alzheimer's patients, on the other hand, do not typically show significant changes in empathy (
Rankin et al., 2005a). Empathy has yet to be directly studied in other neurodegenerative conditions involving behaviour changes, such as corticobasal degeneration (CBD) and progressive supra-nuclear palsy (PSP). Only a few descriptive studies have directly examined the brain structures mediating empathy loss in dementia patients. In a case study of four FTLD patients, Perry found that patients with damage to the temporal cortex of the non-language dominant hemisphere showed loss of empathy (
Perry et al., 2001).
Thus, both patient and functional neuroimaging studies suggest that a network of brain regions in the temporal, parietal and frontal lobes is involved in empathy, but additional data from human lesion studies is needed. In this study, a psychometrically validated behaviour inventory was combined with quantitative analysis of structural MRI scans in order to investigate the neural basis of empathy in patients with neurodegenerative disease. The aim of the study was to determine the degree to which regional differences in brain volumes correspond to real-life empathic behaviour.