There has been considerable interest recently in the neural correlates of the ‘self

’, and results across a number of studies indicate that both anterior medial cortex (medial frontal gyrus and/or anterior cingulate cortex) and posterior medial cortex (posterior cingulate cortex and/or precuneus) are involved in self-referential processing (e.g. Ochsner
et al.,
2005; Vogt and Laureys,
2005). For example, Johnson
et al. (
2002) reported greater activity in these areas when participants answered yes/no questions about whether traits, attitudes and abilities were characteristic of them (e.g.
I often forget things) than when they answered general semantic knowledge questions (e.g.
You need water to live). Fossati
et al. (
2003) reported medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate activity associated with evaluating positive and negative traits for self-relevance
vs for social desirability. Macrae
et al. (
2004) showed that activity in medial prefrontal cortex during evaluation of the self-relevance of traits was greater for those traits judged to be self-relevant than for those judged not to be self-relevant and was greater for those subsequently recognized compared with those subsequently forgotten. Collectively, these and other findings (e.g. Craik
et al.,
1999) suggest that anterior and posterior medial cortical areas are recruited during self-reflective thought. Furthermore, these areas often appear to ‘deactivate’ during cognitive tasks, which has led to the suggestion that self-reflective thought may be a common ‘default mode’ when individuals are not otherwise engaged (e.g. Gusnard
et al.,
2001). Activity in medial prefrontal cortex is also observed in tasks in which participants make judgments about others, especially close ‘others’ (Ochsner
et al.,
2005), or people they see as similar to themselves (Mitchell
et al.,
2005); these findings are consistent with the idea that people draw on self-reflection in understanding others (e.g. Frith and Frith,
2001; Mitchell
et al.,
2005).
In spite of this growing evidence that both anterior and posterior medial areas are involved in self-referential thought (see Macrae
et al.,
2004; Ochsner
et al.,
2005 for reviews of findings focusing on medial frontal areas, and Vogt and Laureys,
2005; Cavanna and Trimble,
2006, for reviews focusing on medial posterior areas), the relative roles and specific functions of anterior and posterior medial regions during self-reflection remain to be clarified. One approach to clarifying functions of these brain regions is to contrast judgments of the self with the same judgments about others (Ochsner
et al.,
2004,
2005). Another approach is to contrast different types of judgments about the same targets (e.g. mentalistic
vs perceptual, Mitchell
et al.,
2005). A third approach, which we have taken here, is to contrast different types of self-relevant thoughts, in this case, about one's
agendas (i.e. goals, e.g. Johnson and Reeder,
1997).
Motivationally significant agendas guide our perception, thought and behaviour, helping to define a ‘self’ and to regulate our interactions with others and the general environment. As discussed above, studies investigating neural correlates of self-relevant processing often ask participants for judgments about the self-relevance of traits. However, in characterizing a self, an individual's agendas (e.g. to have a family, become an actor, keep healthy, pay the bills) are perhaps as equally important as their traits and are a frequent target of self-reflection in everyday life. Furthermore, just as there are a multitude of traits that can describe a self, there are a multitude of potential agendas, from the immediate (e.g. finding a restaurant) to the longer term [e.g. making progress on a life task (Cantor and Kihlstrom,
1987) or achieving a possible future self (Markus and Nurius,
1986)].
Nevertheless, at a relatively abstract level of categorization, agendas may be divided into two broad classes based on the two self-regulatory, motivational systems proposed by Higgins (
1997,
1998): promotion and prevention. A promotion orientation is associated with seeking advancement and accomplishment, whereas a prevention orientation is associated with concerns of safety and responsibility. This distinction is based on the idea that while individuals generally approach pleasure and avoid pain, the nature and relative importance of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain differs across individuals and within individuals across situations (see also Carver and White,
1994).
The idea of variation in individuals’ regulatory focus highlights the difference between agendas and traits; two people could both be described by the trait ‘planful’, but planful about what? A person with a predominantly promotion focus would be more likely to be planful about attaining positive rewards or outcomes, while a person with a predominantly prevention focus would be more likely to be planful about avoiding negative events or outcomes. Although a promotion or prevention focus may dominate, the aspects of the self that are active change dynamically across situations (e.g. Markus and Wurf,
1987), thus most individuals have both promotion and prevention agendas. For example, the same person can hold both the hope of becoming rich (a promotion agenda) and the duty to support an aging parent (a prevention agenda), or the aspiration to be a good citizen and the obligation to be a well-informed voter. As individuals, hopes and aspirations and duties and obligations make up a large part of our mental life and constitute the motivational scaffolding for much of our behaviour.
Higgins and colleagues have reported a number of findings from behavioural studies consistent with their self-regulatory framework (e.g. Higgins
et al.,
1997; Shah and Higgins,
2001; Freitas and Higgins,
2002). For example, Freitas and Higgins (
2002) found that individuals rated a search task as more enjoyable when the goal was framed to be consistent with their orientation (e.g. finding helpful elements for promotion-focused individuals and finding harmful elements for prevention-focused individuals). Rating the emotionality of words was faster when ratings were along orientation-consistent emotional dimensions (Shah and Higgins,
2001).
A recent neuroimaging study provides converging evidence that self-regulatory focus influences attentional processes and affective responses. Cunningham
et al. (
2005) found that during an evaluative task in which participants made judgments about the valence of concepts (e.g.
recycling,
terrorism,
love,
affirmative action), activity in the amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex and extra-striate cortex was correlated with the participants’ scores on a later promotion/prevention questionnaire. Specifically, a promotion focus was associated with sensitivity to positive stimuli in these regions and a prevention focus was associated with sensitivity to negative stimuli in these same regions, suggesting that regulatory focus may tune a single neural system to detect motivationally significant stimuli. Although the Cunningham
et al. (
2005) study provides support for the idea that self-regulatory orientation modulates processing of externally presented stimuli, to our knowledge, the neural activity associated with self-reflection in the context of a promotion focus
vs a prevention focus has not been investigated.
The present studies investigated neural activity when participants were asked to think about self-relevant agendas related to either a promotion (think about your
hopes and aspirations) or prevention (think about your
duties and obligations) focus. We compared neural activity associated with thinking about these two different types of self-relevant agendas and with thinking about non-self-relevant topics (
distraction). We expected greater activity in anterior and/or posterior medial regions associated with these two self-reflection conditions compared with the distraction control condition because thinking about one's agendas, like thinking about one's traits, is self-referential. Such a finding would also be consistent, for example, with Luu and Tucker's (
2004) proposal that both anterior cingulate and posterior cingulate cortex contribute to action regulation by representing goals and expectancies.
Clinical findings also suggest that there should be differences in neural activity associated with self-reflection
vs distraction. Behavioural data show that the distraction manipulation used here provides a short-term reduction of negative self-relevant thought in people prone to depression, with a concomitant reduction in depressed mood (Nolen-Hoeksema,
2004). If distraction reduces self-focused rumination, we might expect to find less activity in brain areas associated with self-focus in distraction compared with self-reflection conditions.
In Experiment 1, self-reflection was induced prior to scanning using a between subjects essay task that focused some participants on their hopes and aspirations (promotion focus) and others on their duties and obligations (prevention focus) (Freitas and Higgins,
2002). These promotion and prevention inductions, like the rumination inductions used in behavioural studies of depression (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema,
2004), encouraged attention to the self but were more goal-directed than those typically used in rumination studies (e.g. where participants might be asked to think about how they are feeling). During scanning, short periods of self-reflection about the pre-scan essay agenda were intermixed with distraction. The distraction condition used items (e.g. think about
polar bears fishing) from the standard distraction condition in previous behavioural rumination studies (Nolen-Hoeksema,
2004). Experiment 2 was a completely within-subjects design in which there was no pre-scan essay induction phase. Rather, focus was induced ‘online’ with randomly intermixed promotion, prevention and distraction prompts. Experiment 2 thus provided information about whether the same regions were identified in promotion and prevention self-focus when participants were asked to flexibly consider both promotion and prevention agendas on different trials as when a single type of self-focus was repeatedly engaged over an extended period, as in Experiment 1. In both experiments, marked differences in patterns of neural activity in anterior and posterior medial cortex during self-reflection compared with distraction were observed, as well as a double dissociation between anterior and posterior medial regions in the relative activity levels during promotion and prevention focused self-reflection.