Some animal calls have the unusual property of seeming to denote environmental events. Such
referential signals are produced in response to specific stimuli (e.g. approach of a particular predator and discovery of food) and are sufficient to evoke from companions the full suite of appropriate responses (e.g. adaptive escape behaviour and food search). Given the cognitive sophistication implied by such systems, it was logical for initial research to concentrate on non-human primates, beginning with vervet monkeys (
Cercopithecus aethiops;
Seyfarth et al. 1980). A flurry of recent papers has revealed that referential signalling may be relatively widespread. For example, it is also present in other cercopithecines (
Zuberbühler 2000a,
b,
2001), tufted capuchins (
Cebus apella nigritus;
Di Bitetti 2003), lemurs (
Macedonia 1990), at least one non-primate mammal (suricates (
Suricata suricatta);
Manser 2001;
Manser et al. 2001) and several species of birds, including fowl (
Evans et al. 1993;
Evans & Marler 1994;
Evans & Evans 1999), ravens (
Bugnyar et al. 2001), yellow warblers (
Dendroica petechia;
Gill & Sealy 2004) and black-capped chickadees (
Poecile atricapilla;
Templeton et al. 2005).
Referential signalling is controversial because it potentially extends the parallels between animal communication and language (
Hauser 1996;
Evans 1997;
Fitch 2005), long considered the principal exception to an otherwise clear pattern of evolutionary continuity (
Darwin 1871). Some linguists accept that there is evidence for a primitive type of reference in animal communication (
Bickerton 1990;
Pinker 1994); others stress the apparent lack of volitional control and conclude that such analogies are not compelling (
Lieberman 1994). Similarly, some biologists have objected that referential signals may reveal only the subsequent behaviour of the sender (
Smith 1991) or that it is not useful to think of animal signals as containing information at all (
Owings & Morton 1998). In sum, conventional studies of call production and playback experiments can establish only that animals behave
as if their signals describe external events.
The central issue in this debate is both straightforward and empirically accessible: it concerns the cognitive processes that must be invoked to explain the observed pattern of receiver behaviour. Words derive their meaning from mental representations that correspond to stimulus categories. If referential signals and language are truly analogous, then they should similarly evoke representations of the eliciting event (i.e. stimulate retrieval of stored information that then determines receiver response). This property would correspond to Gallistel's ‘nominal representation’
(1990), which is the lowest level of cognitive complexity: it would establish that calls ‘stand for’ something in the environment. The design of most previous studies has not allowed exclusion of more parsimonious alternatives, such as the possibility that referential signals might simply trigger appropriate motor patterns in a reflexive way (
Wallman 1992; c.f.
Zuberbühler et al. 1999;
Zuberbühler 2000a,
b). If this were so, then the apparent similarity with language would be illusory.