Reverse genetics technology [
23,
40,
41], used to generate influenza viruses from cells cotransfected with plasmids expressing influenza virus gene segments, has been applied to vaccine development since 1998 [
11,
12,
15]. The technology is especially valuable for the generation of vaccines against HPAI viruses because it permits modification of gene(s) to remove specific virulence motifs such as the highly cleavable multibasic amino acid motif in the HA protein. The generation of a candidate vaccine for human use requires transfection of cells that are qualified for use in generation of vaccines for use in humans; subsequent amplification and biological cloning are carried out in SPF embryonated hen's eggs. The H5N1 viruses that were targeted for vaccine development were selected in consultation with public health authorities and represent viruses isolated in 1997, 2003, and 2004 from human cases of H5N1 infection. These
wt viruses were antigenically distinguishable from each other using postinfection ferret antisera [
4]. Live, attenuated vaccine candidates were generated against each of the three
wt viruses using a common strategy. The HA gene of each of the live, attenuated vaccine candidates was modified to remove the multibasic virulence motif as described in earlier publications [
11,
12,
15], and the six internal protein genes were derived from the highly attenuated AA
ca donor virus, as described in [
15]. The H5N1
ca candidate vaccine viruses displayed the
ts and
att phenotypes that are specified by the internal protein genes of the AA
ca [
26,
27], and the viruses failed to plaque in CEF cells in the absence of trypsin, consistent with the absence of the multibasic cleavage site in the HA.
The safety of the H5N1
ca vaccine viruses was established in mice and ferrets. The H5N1 1997
ca and H5N1 2004
ca viruses were not lethal for mice, and when compared with the corresponding H5N1
wt viruses, they were restricted in replication in the upper and lower respiratory tract of mice. The acquisition of the six AA
ca internal protein genes by the H5N1 1997
wt and H5N1 2004
wt viruses attenuated these viruses for mice. The level of restriction of replication of the H2N2 and H5N1
wt viruses specified by the six AA
ca internal protein genes was comparable, indicating that the acquisition of these genes reproducibly attenuated the H5N1 avian influenza viruses for mice. This has also been seen for an H9N2 avian influenza virus [
32]. Thus, the observation that the H5N1 2003
wt and
ca viruses replicated to similar levels in mice was unexpected. Since the H5N1 2003
wt virus itself replicated to a low level and exhibited minimal lethality, it is reasonable to suggest that this H5N1
wt virus contains sequences that restrict its replication in mice. If these sequences occur in one or more of the internal protein genes of the virus, it is not surprising that substitution of these attenuating sequences with the six internal protein genes of the AA
ca virus did not result in further attenuation. This suggestion will need experimental verification. The
att phenotype was also seen in the ferret model: the H5N1 2004
wt and H5N1 1997
wt viruses replicated to high titers in the upper and lower respiratory tract, while the H5N1 2004
ca and H5N1 1997
ca viruses were attenuated in the nasal turbinates and were undetectable in the lungs and brain of ferrets. The similar levels of attenuation displayed by H5N1 2004
ca and H5N1 1997
ca in mice and ferrets indicate that either animal model could be used to demonstrate the attenuation of reassortant viruses bearing internal protein genes from the AA
ca donor virus. Thus, the H5N1
ca viruses were safe for the respiratory tract of mice and ferrets, and additional studies indicated that the H5N1 2004
ca virus did not spread from the respiratory tract of mice or ferrets to the brain, while the H5N1 2004
wt virus readily infected the brains of these animals. The H5N1
ca viruses, in contrast to the H5N1
wt viruses, were not lethal for chickens in the standard intravenous pathogenicity test or when administered intranasally, indicating that these viruses should not pose a threat to agriculture. However, the H5N1
ca viruses would not be suitable candidate vaccines for use in poultry, because they fail to replicate and to induce an antibody response in chickens.
Despite a high level of replication in the respiratory tract of mice, the H5N1
ca candidate vaccine viruses were weakly immunogenic in mice following a single dose. Neutralizing antibody titers induced following a single dose continued to rise for 1–2 mo following immunization, indicating that the functional antibody response develops slowly in mice. A second dose of vaccine resulted in a significant boost in antibody titer and in cross-reactivity of the antibody with antigenically distinguishable H5N1 viruses. If similar antibody kinetics are observed in clinical trials, a single dose of vaccine may suffice to confer protection, but the protection may be slow to develop. A boost in antibody titers followed a second dose of vaccine despite the fact that replication of the second dose of vaccine was not detected. Thus, a delayed maturation of functional antibody occurred in response to the H5N1
ca vaccine viruses compared to that seen with other influenza A viruses [
32,
42]. The delayed antibody response had a correlate in efficacy studies.
A single dose of H5N1 ca vaccines provided complete protection from lethality following challenge with homologous and heterologous H5N1 wt viruses and prevented systemic spread of the wt challenge viruses to the brain. A single dose of H5N1 ca vaccines also resulted in statistically significant restriction of replication of the wt challenge viruses in the lungs that greatly exceeded that induced by infection with the heterosubtypic AA ca (H2N2) virus, thus indicating that this protection was HA- and NA-specific. However, a single dose of vaccine did not induce complete protection against replication of challenge virus in the respiratory tract. In a clinical setting, this partial protection in mice may translate to protection from severe illness and death in humans. Two doses of the H5N1 ca candidate vaccine viruses induced high titers of antibody and provided complete protection from pulmonary replication of homologous and heterologous H5N1 wt viruses. Replication of the second dose of vaccine virus could not be detected, but antigenic stimulation was sufficient to provide a boost in immune response. Two doses of the H5N1 ca vaccine in mice and in ferrets provided complete protection from pulmonary replication of homologous and heterologous H5N1 wt viruses, including A/Indonesia/05/2005 (H5N1). In mice, two doses of the H5N1 ca vaccine provided complete protection from systemic dissemination of challenge virus. Virus was detectable in the brains of ferrets following challenge with a high dose of H5N1 wt virus, but viral titers were statistically significantly reduced compared to mock-immunized animals. Similar to the observations in mice immunized with the AA ca virus, the protection in ferrets against pulmonary replication of challenge virus afforded by the H5N1 ca vaccines exceeded that observed when ferrets were immunized with an H1N1 ca virus bearing the same AA ca internal protein genes, which suggests that the protection is specific to the H5 HA.
It is not possible to predict the evolution of the H5 HA or to predict which strain, if any, will become pandemic. Therefore, an H5N1 vaccine should elicit a cross-protective immune response against a range of H5N1 viruses, including newly emerged strains. In addition, a pandemic vaccine needs to be preselected before the pandemic virus emerges in the population and characterized in humans for safety and immunogenicity, since it is highly unlikely that a vaccine can be generated, manufactured, and characterized rapidly enough to thwart spread of a pandemic strain. The assumption underlying this approach is that the preselected pandemic vaccine virus can prevent disease caused by antigenically and genetically divergent viruses belonging to the same subtypes that appear in nature. In the present study, we were able to directly evaluate this assumption, and our data on the H5N1
ca vaccines are very encouraging in this regard. A single dose of an H5N1
ca vaccine containing the 1997 H5 HA provided complete protection from lethality in mice following challenge with homologous and heterologous H5N1
wt viruses, including a clade 2 virus isolated from Indonesia in 2005. Two doses of the H5N1
ca vaccine provided complete protection from pulmonary replication in mice and ferrets and systemic dissemination of homologous and heterologous H5N1
wt viruses in mice. The high level of efficacy of the H5N1 1997
ca virus against challenge with antigenically and genetically diverse H5N1
wt viruses isolated over a span of 8 y suggests that the H5N1 viruses are evolving in nature to infect wild birds and domestic poultry, and not predominantly to evade antibodies as they do in humans. If the vaccine candidates described in this paper elicit a broadly cross-reactive protective immune response in humans, they would support the approach of developing one or two pandemic vaccine candidates for each subtype (H4 through H16) that are able to induce a broadly protective immune response to
wt viruses within that subtype. The present findings serve to contradict recently expressed concerns about such a strategy [
5,
6].
All humans are immunologically naïve with respect to the HA at the start of a pandemic, and newly emerged pandemic viruses contain at least an antigenically novel HA and may also contain a novel NA subtype. Live, attenuated influenza virus vaccines potentially offer three major advantages over inactivated vaccines for rapid immunization of an immunologically naïve population [
43]. First, in naïve populations, live virus vaccines induce higher levels of antibody than inactivated virus vaccines [
21,
44]. Second, live virus vaccines may induce protective immunity more quickly and would require fewer doses than inactivated vaccine [
19]. In immunologically naïve populations, two doses of inactivated virus vaccine delivered 1 mo apart are required for induction of immunity [
45], and significant immunity is not achieved until the response to the second dose is established, which occurs at about 40 d after immunization. Even at this time, mucosal immunity, especially that in the upper respiratory tract, is weak. In contrast, live influenza virus vaccines against human influenza viruses can induce a high level of immunity following a single dose, and immunity is achieved as early as 7–10 d following initial immunization, as indicated by the clearance of the vaccine virus from the respiratory tract. A live influenza virus vaccine induces both CD8
+ T cell [
46] and mucosal IgA antibodies in addition to serum antibodies [
42], and therefore is the vaccine of choice for an immunologically naïve population. Third, the combined humoral and mucosal immune response generated by live virus vaccines in naïve populations results in broad protection against antigenically drifted strains. For example, the live, attenuated H3N2 human influenza vaccine containing an A/Wuhan/359/95 (H3N2)-like strain was effective in protecting against the A/Sydney/5/97 (H3N2)-like antigenic drift variant [
47]. This may be a particularly useful feature in the event of a pandemic, in which a vaccine generated from the emergent pandemic virus strain is not available. Whether these theoretical advantages will be seen with live, attenuated H5N1 vaccines in humans remains to be established.
In summary, the modified H5N1 ca candidate vaccine viruses were immunogenic in mice, attenuated in mice, ferrets, and chickens, and protective in mice and ferrets against subsequent challenge with homologous and heterologous wt H5N1 influenza viruses. It is not known whether investigational live virus vaccines bearing avian influenza HA and NA genes in the AA ca background will be overattenuated in humans or will be associated with some residual virulence. Live, attenuated vaccines must be able to replicate to levels that elicit a protective immune response without causing disease in the host, so a balance between attenuation and immunogenicity must be achieved. A live, attenuated H5N1 vaccine would be administered to the general population only if an influenza pandemic caused by a virus of the H5N1 subtype were imminent, with confirmation of human-to-human transmission, or was already underway in the United States, and it would be used only on the recommendation of public health authorities. However, it is important to generate and carefully evaluate candidate live, attenuated H5N1 vaccines in clinical trials in humans because of their potential advantages over other vaccine approaches.