In the 1980s, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) were heralded as an important mechanism to control rising health care costs. Proponents believed that, under a capitated payment system, HMOs could achieve savings by promoting prevention and effectively managing acute and chronic conditions, thereby reducing the needs for care and costly hospitalizations among enrollees. However, the capitated payment system also creates a short-term incentive for restricting health care services, which, combined with traditional HMO methods such as limited provider networks, primary care gatekeeping of access to specialty services and medical necessity authorization, may adversely affect quality of care. The concern over withholding services by HMOs to achieve savings became especially salient as the number of HMOs increased in the mid-1980s, resulting in more competition among HMOs and higher turnovers among HMO enrollees (
Hellander 2001;
Wholey et al. 1997). The growth of for-profit HMOs in the 1990s (
Gabel 1997) and, more recently, the diversification of HMOs' products in response to consumer backlash and legislative pressure over restrictive care (
Draper et al. 2002) further exacerbate the concern.
In general, empirical studies have shown positive effects of HMOs in containing health care costs (
Frank and Welch 1985;
Gaskin and Hadley 1997;
McLaughlin 1987;
Robinson 1991,
1996;
Zwanziger, Melnick, and Bamezai 2000), although there were some conflicting findings (
Frank and Welch 1985;
McLaughlin 1987,
1988). Researchers have also observed a significant shift in patterns of care associated with HMOs, such as fewer hospitalizations and more preventive services used by HMO enrollees than their fee-for-service counterparts, and simultaneous increases in ambulatory care and decreases in hospitalizations accompanied by increased HMO penetration (
Luft 1981;
Manning et al. 1987;
Wholey et al. 1997). However, the evidence of HMOs' impacts on quality of care and use of preventive services is limited and inconsistent (
Decker and Hempstead 1999;
Gordon, Rundall, and Parker 1998;
Riley et al. 1999;
Sullivan 1999). For example, increased cancer screenings were associated with HMO enrollment (
Gordon, Rundall, and Parker 1998) and higher HMO penetration (
Decker and Hempstead 1999). On the other hand, Medicare HMO enrollees were diagnosed at a later stage of breast cancer (
Riley et al. 1999). More recent literature indicates that HMOs and fee-for-service plans provide roughly comparable quality of care. However, HMOs offer more comprehensive preventive services (
Miller and Luft 2002).
Three studies have investigated the association between HMOs and hospitalizations due to certain preventable hospitalizations.
Porell (2001) found that discharge rates for asthma and dehydration were higher for Medicaid HMO enrollees than Medicaid non-HMO enrollees in Massachusetts, suggesting potential access to or quality of care problems in HMO enrollees. However,
Friedman and Basu (2001) reported that a 20 percent increase in HMO penetration in a county led to a 1.8 percent reduction in hospitalizations due to 10 ACSCs among children in New York State.
Backus et al. (2002) showed that a 10 percent increase in HMO/PPO (preferred provider organization) penetration resulted in a 3.1 percent decrease in hospitalizations due to five chronic conditions in California from 1990 to 1997. While these studies have their own limitations, they shed some light on the relationship between HMO penetration and preventable hospitalizations.
This study extends the literature in the following ways. First, while earlier studies used data from a single state, our study includes 932 urban counties in 22 states, making our study more generalizable. Second, we use 14 more vigorously validated preventable hospitalization indicators, including both acute and chronic conditions that afflict both adults and children. Third, our study includes all hospitalized patients in the community, not a subset of patients (e.g., only Medicaid patients). And finally, our measure of HMO penetration is population-based and created at the community-level. Consequently, we are able to estimate the effect of HMO penetration as it affects preventable hospitalizations for an entire community, both HMO enrollees (i.e., direct effect) and non-enrollees (i.e., spillover effect).